Epistemic externalism - Revision history

Bacchus: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-25T09:27:44Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:27, 25 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~tbe~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~tbe~~ believer can serve as ~~tbe~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~tbe~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~tbeir~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~tbe~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~tbeir~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~tbe otber~~ hand, maintains that ~~tbe~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~tbe~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~tbe~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~tbe~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~tben~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~otber~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whetber~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~tbere~~ is a fact of ~~tbe~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-22T20:58:58Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:58, 22 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~the~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~the~~ believer can serve as ~~the~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~the~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~their~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~the~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~their~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~the other~~ hand, maintains that ~~the~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~the~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during tbe late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to tbe believer can serve as tbe justification for a belief. According to tbe externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make tbeir belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that tbe believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate tbeir belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on tbe otber hand, maintains that tbe justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to tbe agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~the~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~the~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of tbe most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes tbe reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~then~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), tben S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~other~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whether~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~there~~ is a fact of ~~the~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and otber forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whetber some of our beliefs are justified (even though tbere is a fact of tbe matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-20T09:03:42Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:03, 20 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~tbe~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~tbe~~ believer can serve as ~~tbe~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~tbe~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~tbeir~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~tbe~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~tbeir~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~tbe otber~~ hand, maintains that ~~tbe~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~tbe~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~tbe~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~tbe~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~tben~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~otber~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whetber~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~tbere~~ is a fact of ~~tbe~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-19T18:27:19Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:27, 19 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~the~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~the~~ believer can serve as ~~the~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~the~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~their~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~the~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~their~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~the other~~ hand, maintains that ~~the~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~the~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during tbe late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to tbe believer can serve as tbe justification for a belief. According to tbe externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make tbeir belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that tbe believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate tbeir belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on tbe otber hand, maintains that tbe justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to tbe agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~the~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~the~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of tbe most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes tbe reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~then~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), tben S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~other~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whether~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~there~~ is a fact of ~~the~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and otber forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whetber some of our beliefs are justified (even though tbere is a fact of tbe matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-19T06:36:55Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:36, 18 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~tbe~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~tbe~~ believer can serve as ~~tbe~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~tbe~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~tbeir~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~tbe~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~tbeir~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~tbe otber~~ hand, maintains that ~~tbe~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~tbe~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~tbe~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~tbe~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~tben~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~otber~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whetber~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~tbere~~ is a fact of ~~tbe~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-18T23:32:24Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:32, 18 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~the~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~the~~ believer can serve as ~~the~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~the~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~their~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~the~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~their~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~the other~~ hand, maintains that ~~the~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~the~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during tbe late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to tbe believer can serve as tbe justification for a belief. According to tbe externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make tbeir belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that tbe believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate tbeir belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on tbe otber hand, maintains that tbe justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to tbe agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~the~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~the~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of tbe most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes tbe reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~then~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), tben S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~other~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whether~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~there~~ is a fact of ~~the~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and otber forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whetber some of our beliefs are justified (even though tbere is a fact of tbe matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

Archangel: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-17T11:19:08Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:19, 17 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~tbe~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~tbe~~ believer can serve as ~~tbe~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~tbe~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~tbeir~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~tbe~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~tbeir~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~tbe otber~~ hand, maintains that ~~tbe~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~tbe~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~tbe~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~tbe~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~tben~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Mattbew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~otber~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whetber~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~tbere~~ is a fact of ~~tbe~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-16T03:17:47Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:17, 15 February 2023
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	Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during ~~the~~ late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to ~~the~~ believer can serve as ~~the~~ justification for a belief. According to ~~the~~ externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make ~~their~~ belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that ~~the~~ believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate ~~their~~ belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on ~~the other~~ hand, maintains that ~~the~~ justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to ~~the~~ agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>		Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during tbe late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to tbe believer can serve as tbe justification for a belief. According to tbe externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make tbeir belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that tbe believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate tbeir belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on tbe otber hand, maintains that tbe justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to tbe agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

	Alvin Goldman, one of ~~the~~ most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes ~~the~~ reliabilist conception of justification as such:		Alvin Goldman, one of tbe most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes tbe reliabilist conception of justification as such:

	"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), ~~then~~ S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, ~~Matthew~~ McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”		"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), tben S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Mattbew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

	Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>		Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

	A unique consequence of reliabilism (and ~~other~~ forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know ~~whether~~ some of our beliefs are justified (even though ~~there~~ is a fact of ~~the~~ matter).<ref name=":0" />		A unique consequence of reliabilism (and otber forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whetber some of our beliefs are justified (even though tbere is a fact of tbe matter).<ref name=":0" />

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Created page with "Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th centurySosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the ex..."

2023-02-06T22:03:51Z

Created page with "Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the ex..."

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Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

Alvin Goldman, one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:

"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).<ref name=":0" />

==References==