Rightof Genghiskhan at 04:25, 3 April 2023

2023-04-03T04:25:57Z

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	'''Moral realism''' is the [[philosophical]] doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with [[non-cognitivism]] (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive, but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, and Thomas Nagel.		'''Moral realism''' is the [[philosophical]] doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with [[non-cognitivism]] (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, and Thomas Nagel.

	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Created page with "'''Moral realism''' is the philosophical doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with non-cognitivism (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive, but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realis..."

2023-02-03T22:49:03Z

Created page with "'''Moral realism''' is the philosophical doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with non-cognitivism (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive, but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realis..."

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'''Moral realism''' is the [[philosophical]] doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with [[non-cognitivism]] (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive, but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, and Thomas Nagel.

[[Category:Philosophy]]

Moral realism - Revision history

Rightof Genghiskhan at 04:25, 3 April 2023