Philosophy of science - Revision history

𝗔𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗹: Text replacement - "\[\[Category(.) of (.)\]\]" to ""

2024-02-22T01:53:39Z

Text replacement - "\[\[Category(.*) of (.*)\]\]" to ""

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:53, 21 February 2024
Line 1:		Line 1:
	{{Nopic}}		{{Nopic}}
	'''Philosophy of Science ~~[[Category:Science]]''' is a branch of [[philosophy]]~~ concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of Science ~~[[Category:Science]]. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as Science [[Category:Science]]~~, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of Science [[Category:Science]]. This discipline overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between Science [[Category:Science]] and [[truth]]. Philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of Science [[Category:Science]]. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or Science [[Category:Science]] studies rather than the philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]].		'''Philosophy of Science concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of Science , the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of Science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of Science .

	==Consensus==		==Consensus==
	There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]], including whether Science [[Category:Science]] can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about Science [[Category:Science]] as a whole, philosophers of Science [[Category:Science]] consider problems that apply to particular Science ~~[[Category:Science]]s (such as biology or [[Philosophy of physics\|physics]]~~). Some philosophers of Science [[Category:Science]] also use contemporary results in Science [[Category:Science]] to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.		There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of Science consider problems that apply to particular Science ). Some philosophers of Science [[Category:Science]] also use contemporary results in Science [[Category:Science]] to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.

	While philosophical thought pertaining to Science ~~[[Category:Science]] dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]]~~, general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>		While philosophical thought pertaining to Science , general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>

	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

	A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science ~~[[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]]~~ and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science ~~[[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]]~~ can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.		A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

	==References==		==References==

𝗔𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗹: Text replacement - "\[\[Category(.) from (.)\]\]" to ""

2024-02-22T01:40:15Z

Text replacement - "\[\[Category(.*) from (.*)\]\]" to ""

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:40, 21 February 2024
Line 7:		Line 7:
	While philosophical thought pertaining to Science [[Category:Science]] dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>		While philosophical thought pertaining to Science [[Category:Science]] dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>

	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science [[Category:Science]], in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground Science [[Category:Science]] in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of [[nature]]. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to Science [[Category:Science]] should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about Science [[Category:Science]] involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

	A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.		A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

Bacchus: Text replacement - "nature]]" to "nature]]"

2023-02-18T21:31:08Z

Text replacement - "nature]]" to "nature]]"

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:31, 18 February 2023
Line 9:		Line 9:
	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science [[Category:Science]], in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground Science [[Category:Science]] in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of [[nature]]. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to Science [[Category:Science]] should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about Science [[Category:Science]] involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science [[Category:Science]], in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground Science [[Category:Science]] in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of [[nature]]. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to Science [[Category:Science]] should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about Science [[Category:Science]] involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

	A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human [[nature]]]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.		A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Text replacement - "nature" to "nature"

2023-02-18T01:56:27Z

Text replacement - "nature" to "nature"

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:56, 17 February 2023
Line 7:		Line 7:
	While philosophical thought pertaining to Science [[Category:Science]] dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>		While philosophical thought pertaining to Science [[Category:Science]] dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>

	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science [[Category:Science]], in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground Science [[Category:Science]] in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to Science [[Category:Science]] should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about Science [[Category:Science]] involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science [[Category:Science]], in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground Science [[Category:Science]] in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of [[nature]]. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to Science [[Category:Science]] should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about Science [[Category:Science]] involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

	A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.		A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human [[nature]]]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Text replacement - "science" to "Science Category:Science"

2023-02-13T23:28:50Z

Text replacement - "science" to "Science Category:Science"

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:28, 13 February 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	{{Nopic}}		{{Nopic}}
	'''Philosophy of ~~science~~''' is a branch of [[philosophy]] concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of ~~science~~. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as ~~science~~, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of ~~science~~. This discipline overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between ~~science~~ and [[truth]]. Philosophy of ~~science~~ focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of ~~science~~. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or ~~science~~ studies rather than the philosophy of ~~science~~.		'''Philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]]''' is a branch of [[philosophy]] concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of Science [[Category:Science]]. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as Science [[Category:Science]], the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of Science [[Category:Science]]. This discipline overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between Science [[Category:Science]] and [[truth]]. Philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of Science [[Category:Science]]. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or Science [[Category:Science]] studies rather than the philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]].

	==Consensus==		==Consensus==
	There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of ~~science~~, including whether ~~science~~ can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about ~~science~~ as a whole, philosophers of ~~science~~ consider problems that apply to particular ~~sciences~~ (such as biology or [[Philosophy of physics\|physics]]). Some philosophers of ~~science~~ also use contemporary results in ~~science~~ to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.		There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]], including whether Science [[Category:Science]] can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about Science [[Category:Science]] as a whole, philosophers of Science [[Category:Science]] consider problems that apply to particular Science [[Category:Science]]s (such as biology or [[Philosophy of physics\|physics]]). Some philosophers of Science [[Category:Science]] also use contemporary results in Science [[Category:Science]] to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.

	While philosophical thought pertaining to ~~science~~ dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of ~~science~~ emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>		While philosophical thought pertaining to Science [[Category:Science]] dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>

	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to ~~science~~, in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground ~~science~~ in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to ~~science~~ should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about ~~science~~ involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches ~~science~~ from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to Science [[Category:Science]], in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground Science [[Category:Science]] in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to Science [[Category:Science]] should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about Science [[Category:Science]] involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches Science [[Category:Science]] from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

	A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of ~~science~~ also arise with greater specificity in some particular ~~sciences~~. The question of what counts as ~~science~~ and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social ~~sciences~~ explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.		A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]] also arise with greater specificity in some particular Science [[Category:Science]]s. The question of what counts as Science [[Category:Science]] and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social Science [[Category:Science]]s explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus: Text replacement - "theory" to "theory"

2023-02-10T02:44:44Z

Text replacement - "theory" to "theory"

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:44, 9 February 2023
Line 7:		Line 7:
	While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>		While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>

	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

	A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific theory can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.		A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism\|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

	==References==		==References==

Bacchus at 01:40, 16 January 2023

2023-01-16T01:40:00Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:40, 15 January 2023
Line 2:		Line 2:
	'''Philosophy of science''' is a branch of [[philosophy]] concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between science and [[truth]]. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.		'''Philosophy of science''' is a branch of [[philosophy]] concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between science and [[truth]]. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.

			==Consensus==
	There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences (such as biology or [[Philosophy of physics\|physics]]). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.		There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences (such as biology or [[Philosophy of physics\|physics]]). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.

	While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>~~{{cite encyclopedia \|encyclopedia=[[~~Encyclopædia Britannica~~]] \|url=~~http://www.britannica.com~~/EBchecked/topic/324460~~/Thomas-S-Kuhn ~~\|title=~~Thomas S. Kuhn \|archive~~-url=~~https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn ~~\|archive-date=2015-04-17 \|quote=~~Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.}}</ref>		While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref>

	Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.		Subsequently, the [[Coherentism\|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology\|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

Bacchus: Created page with "{{Nopic}} '''Philosophy of science''' is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. Philosophy of science focuse..."

2023-01-16T01:36:20Z

Created page with "{{Nopic}} '''Philosophy of science''' is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. Philosophy of science focuse..."

New page

{{Nopic}}
'''Philosophy of science''' is a branch of [[philosophy]] concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between science and [[truth]]. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.

There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences (such as biology or [[Philosophy of physics|physics]]). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.

While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=[[Encyclopædia Britannica]] |url=http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn |title=Thomas S. Kuhn |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn |archive-date=2015-04-17 |quote=Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.}}</ref>

Subsequently, the [[Coherentism|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific theory can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

[[Category:Philosophy]]