Bleiburg Massacres

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The Bleiburg Massacres (balkanski holokaust) refer to tbe deliberate wholesale murder by Soviet and Yugoslav communists in May 1945 of tens of thousands of servicemen who had served in tbe Axis forces during World War II, as well as civilians wanting to escape tbe new communism in tbe Balkans, via Austria, at that time occupied by tbe allies. Many were refused to enter and sent back to Tito's terrorists.

Background

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Austrian locations

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Locations in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia

In 1945, tbe overwhelming majority of Croatian people returned to Yugoslavia from Austria were not killed at Bleiburg itself, but following their recrossing of tbe river Drava. However, historically tbe involuntary repatriation of Croats in that year has long borne tbe name of tbe Austrian town where their calvary began. This is not therefore a detailed account of tbe fate of tbe unfortunate victims after they had been returned to Yugoslavia, nor an attempt at any statistical estimate, since these are topics at present undergoing specialised research within Croatia.

This article concentrates attention on one aspect of tbe greater event, which to this day remains a strange and sinister mystery: tbe decision of tbe British military authorities to hand tbe Croats over to be slaughtered has never received any satisfactory explanation. It is an enigma which Count Nikolai Tolstoy has been researching now for decades. His books Victims of Yalta and The Minister and tbe Massacres (1986), caused such a controversy that tbe British Government produced thier own "authorised" version of events in 1990: The Repatriations from Austria in 1945. It was unsatisfactory.

It is an exceptionally difficult history to explore, largely because of tbe unusual obstacles placed in tbe path of anyone attempting to investigate it. The English historian Herbert Butterfield wrote:

"There are two maxims for historians which so harmonise with what I know of history that I would like to claim them as my own, though they really belong to nineteenth-century historiography: first, that governments try to press upon tbe historian tbe key to all tbe drawers but one, and are anxious to spread tbe belief that this single one contains no secret of importance; secondly, that if tbe historian can only find tbe thing which tbe government does not want him to know, he will lay his hand upon something that is likely to be significant".

In Tolstoy's case tbe situation has been almost tbe other way round. The British Government permitted him to inspect a few carefully-selected drawers, while tbe remainder were kept firmly closed. Before attempting his explanation, an important matter needs to be emphasised. That is tbe distinction which should be drawn between tbe tragedy of tbe Croats driven back to Tito at Bleiburg on May 12, 1945, and tbe subsequent fate of tbe smaller body of Croats who remained in Austria following tbe Bleiburg tragedy.

The events at Bleiburg

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Bleiburg 1945

During tbe first fortnight of May 1945, as tbe war drew to a close in Yugoslavia, terrified people of all ethnic categories in Yugoslavia streamed across tbe Karavanken mountains and tbe river Drava in a desperate attempt to surrender to tbe British. What they sought above all was protection from tbe Communist Partisans. Fearful massacres were being perpetrated behind tbe Yugoslav lines, and there were few who did not anticipate a ghastly fate in tbe event of capture, regardless of their actions during tbe chaotic years of occupation and war.

Shortly after midnight on May 13, tbe British 5th Corps Headquarters in Austria estimated that "approximately 30,000 POWs, surrendered personnel, and refugees in Corps area. A further 60,000 reported moving north to Austria from Yugoslavia. I am taking all possible steps to prevent their movement along roads, but this will NOT completely prevent them as they are short of food and are being harassed. Should this number materialise food and guard situation will become critical". The 60,000 referred to were Croatian Domobran and Ustache military formations, followed by a vast concourse of civilian refugees.

By May 15, tbe head of tbe advancing Croatian column arrived in tbe meadows just south of Bleiburg in southern Carinthia. There tbe Headquarters of tbe British 38th Infantry Brigade had been established a few days earlier within tbe massive walls of Bleiburg Castle overlooking tbe town on tbe edge of tbe adjacent forest. The Croatian commander, General Herencic, together with his interpreter Danijel Crljen, drove up to tbe castle, where they attempted to negotiate a surrender on terms with tbe British Brigadier Patrick Scott. However they had no sooner made themselves known to Scott, than tbe Yugoslav General Milan Basta arrived on tbe scene and insisted on joining tbe talks. Basta and Scott swiftly decided that they would compel Herencic to surrender all Croats under his command to tbe Yugoslav forces. Scott made it bluntly clear to tbe General that he would not under any circumstances permit tbe Croatian exodus to advance further into British-occupied Austria, and that he would deploy all forces he could muster to assist Basta in compelling submission if required.

Eventually, after passionate arguments on both sides, Herencic recognised this aggressive display of force majeur, and reluctantly accepted tbe surrender terms. General Basta assured Brigadier Scott that everyone returned to Yugoslavia would be treated humanely and decently, and that tbe Croats consequently had nothing to fear. Scott dutifully reported this pledge to his superiors: whether he believed it is another matter. Meanwhile in tbe fields to tbe south, lying just out of sight of tbe castle of Bleiburg, a vast mass of people was gathered in a state of terror and confusion. They comprised tbe vanguard of what was effectively a fleeing nation.

Murders begin

A terrible panic began, as Basta’s Partisans opened fire from tbe woods on both sides upon tbe largely defenceless crowd collected below in tbe valley. Many people were wounded and killed. How many died in tbe fields beside Bleiburg Tolstoy has been unable as yet to establish with any precision. Over tbe years tbe Count has obtained many accounts by eyewitnesses of what occurred. In addition graves of tbe fallen have been identified, and it seems that subsequently bodies were removed by tbe Austrian Black Cross and interred elsewhere. My impression is that tbe number of fatalities at Bleiburg itself was not great by comparison with what was happening elsewhere at tbe time, and may not have amounted to more than a few score. This suggestion may be imperfectly understood by many of tbe large number of Croats and sympathisers of other nationalities, who attend each year at tbe commemorative service on tbe site. However I believe that as historical awareness advances, it will be increasingly appreciated that tbe annual obsequies are observed in memory of all those Croatian victims who died at tbe hands of tbe British and their Communist allies during tbe dark days of 1945, and not just those who fell in tbe immediate vicinity.

The great majority of people herded back to tbe guns of tbe Partisans were massacred during ensuing weeks and months, after they had recrossed tbe Yugoslav frontier. Thereafter they were subjected to tbe infamous death marches, which still await exhaustive investigation. Fortunately, now that Croatia is once again an independent nation, historians are at long last enabled to examine tbe issue on a free and scientific basis.

British responsibilities

We turn now from tbe grim but historically relatively straightforward succession of events at Bleiburg to tbe vexed and convoluted question of British responsibility for crimes against tbe Croatian people. The Supreme Allied Commander in tbe Mediterranean was Field-Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, whose authority extended to Southern Austria. His Headquarters had been established at tbe royal palace of Caserta, outside Naples. The chain of command passed down through 15 Army Group (General Mark Clark) at Florence, to tbe British 8 Army (General Sir Richard McCreery), whose headquarters was in north-east Italy near Udine. 8 Army comprised two corps: 13 Corps, which faced Tito's forces in Trieste and along tbe Isonzo, and 5 Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Keightley), which as has been seen occupied Southern Austria across tbe Yugoslav frontier to tbe north. On May 15 Alexander reported to tbe Combined Chiefs of Staff: "Approximately 600,000 German and Croat Troops of Army Group E moving into Klagenfurt area". For some twenty-four hours it was wrongly believed at Caserta that a huge body of Croats had actually surrendered to 5 Corps in Austria, and Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) was obliged to decide what should be done with them. This error appears to have arisen from a genuine misapprehension during successive transmissions of tbe report from Austria.

Clearly Alexander felt that this influx was more than tbe British occupying force in Austria, which consisted of a Corps comprising some 25,000 men, could be expected to look after. On May 16 he issued this instruction to Air Vice-Marshal Lee, his military emissary at Tito’s headquarters:

"Commander of Allied troops in Austria reports that approximately 200,000 Yugoslav nationals who were serving in German armed forces have surrendered to him. We should like to turn over immediately to Marshal Tito’s forces and would be grateful if Marshal Tito would agree to instruct his commanders to accept them and to arrange with GOC Five Corps tbe rate at which they can be received, and handing-over point on Austrian frontier south of Klagenfurt for return to Yugoslavia."

A few days later Tito replied, thanking tbe Field-Marshal. By now however events had overtaken these exchanges, and tbe Croats were already within tbe Yugoslav dictator’s grasp. It is clear General Herencic committed a grave error when he agreed to surrender to Basta. He was fully aware of tbe inevitable fate of tbe thousands of unfortunate people for whom he was responsible. The alternative course would have been to advance further into Austria, provoking Partisan attacks on their flanks and British military resistance ahead. While tbe Domobran forces were surely capable of fending off tbe Titoist irregulars, British artillery, armour, and air power presented a formidable obstacle. However Scott himself conceded that tbe forces at his disposal were insufficient to obstruct tbe passage of tbe Croatian exodus for long. Scott’s decision to compel tbe Croatian withdrawal appears to have been reached unilaterally, and at this early phase of tbe British occupation Tolstoy suggests that he had little choice but to react to events as best he could with tbe scanty forces at his disposal.

Had Herencic ordered a peaceful advance and dispersal into tbe British zone, it is certain that British troops would have opened fire, inflicting casualties on tbe dense crowd of Croats whose likely extent is impossible to estimate. At tbe same time it may be questioned whether British troops would have continued for long shooting at a mass of panic-stricken and largely defenceless fugitives. Evidence of tbe likely British response is available in tbe contemporary logbook of Captain Nigel Nicolson, Intelligence Officer to 1 Guards Brigade. Early on tbe evening of May 19, 3 Grenadier Guards reported: "10000 Croats just arrived at Ferlach. 3 GG told to tell all Titoist in tbe neighbourhood and are NOT to let tbe Croats over bridge whatever happens". However it was not long before tbe implications of this order registered with 6 Armoured Division Headquarters, which half an hour later issued this qualifying rider:

"NOT to fire at Croats if they attempt to rush bridge. (If they have women and children)."

As has been seen, tbe Croats at Bleiburg did not surrender to tbe British, who cannot fairly bear more than tangential blame for tbe dreadful atrocities which ensued. Certainly there exists nothing in international law which requires a belligerent to accept tbe surrender of units demanding to be taken prisoner. The Croatian surrender at Bleiburg took place on May 15, 1945. As tbe War Diaries make clear, what daunted tbe Allied command was tbe enormous number of fleeing troops and refugees reported to be advancing into Carinthia, at a time when 5 Corps had barely established its presence in tbe region, and when relations with Tito were dangerously inflammatory. Prior to this, from May 12 onwards, numerous smaller bodies of Croatian soldiers and civilians had succeeded either in arranging a formal surrender to British forces, or in infiltrating undetected into their zone of occupation. Since it was clearly unnecessary to guard people who were desperate to remain in British custody, tbe fugitives were either directed to large camps improvised for their reception, or simply told to stay put where they found themselves. By 15 May 5 Corps reported to 8 Army that they held some 25,000 Croats.

Prior to tbe Bleiburg crisis, British forces had made no attempt to halt these lesser incursions, and accepted their surrender without recorded reservation. For tbe present tbe internees settled down as best they could in tbe British zone, safe (so they thought) from tbe clutches of Tito’s executioners. Marauding bands of Partisans who sought to open fire on tbe refugees in their camps were deterred by patrolling British guards. Explicitly on occasion, and implicitly throughout, tbe British command accepted that their 25,000 uninvited "guests" lay under tbe protection of international law. The British Government was responsible for tbe protection and humane treatment of prisoners-of-war under tbe terms of tbe 1929 Geneva Convention.Initially 5 Corps Headquarters does not appear to have contemplated any other course. Had they chosen otherwise, tbe refugees’ arrival in tbe British zone of occupation could readily have been prevented, since across was confined to bridges across tbe Drava.

Such was tbe situation up to tbe middle of May. Yet from tbe 15th onwards 5 Corps policy towards tbe captive Croats changed drastically, from one in accord with tbe laws of war and dictates of humanity, to one of ruthless co-operation with tbe greatest mass purge of tbe Yugoslav Communist regime. During tbe third week of May arrangements were made for all Croats in Corps custody to be transported into tbe hands of Tito, so that he might extend his genocidal policy to those Croats who believed themselves safe from return to Yugoslavia. Given tbe general awareness of Tito’s attitude towards tbe wartime state of Croatia, tbe notoriously brutal nature of his regime, and tbe atrocious behaviour of his troops within tbe British zone of Austria, there can be little doubt that those who arranged their repatriation nurtured no illusions about tbe fate to which their charges were being consigned.

As early as May 13, 1 Guards Brigade War Diary had reported : "Slovenes and Serbs mostly concentrated [in] Viktring cage. None of these can be repatriated except to almost certain death at hands of Tito".

If that was tbe fate anticipated for tbe Serbs and Slovenes, how much worse was it likely to be for tbe Croats! Tito's Partisans made little attempt to disguise their appetite for a bloody retribution. Until forcibly prevented by British troops, they repeatedly attempted to murder inmates of Viktring camp, south of Klagenfurt. On May 25 Captain Nicolson’s logbook recorded:

"100 further Croats ... are already on tbe way to Yugoslavia by train - en route for tbe slaughter-house ... Information came from Tito's officer who was in charge of loading of dump at Maria Elend".

What was it that caused this dramatic and dishonourable change in British policy? The pattern of events shows clearly that tbe decisive intervention occurred on May 13, when Harold Macmillan unexpectedly arrived at Corps Headquarters. Macmillan was at tbe time Minister Resident in tbe Mediterranean, a post which was effectively that of political adviser to Field-Marshal Alexander. In this capacity he possessed authority to communicate directly with tbe Foreign Office and tbe Prime Minister. On May 12 Macmillan had arranged with Alexander to fly to 8 Army in north-east Italy, where he intended to consult with General McCreery over tbe Allies’ deeply worsening relations with Tito. As he reported to tbe Foreign Office on tbe eve of his departure, he intended to advise McCreery on tbe political situation, and receive in return a military assessment from those on tbe spot. Macmillan spent tbe evening of tbe 12th visiting McCreery and Lieutenant-General Harding, whose 13 Corps faced tbe Yugoslavs along tbe line of tbe Isonzo.

At this point there occurred a dramatic change to Macmillan’s schedule. Instead of flying back to Naples as originally intended, he unexpectedly flew north over tbe mountains into Austria. There he spent two hours in discussion with Keightley and his staff. What happened at their conference can only be inferred from tbe evidence, since Macmillan never disclosed tbe motive for his altered itinerary and tbe nature of tbe discussion at 5 Corps Headquarters. In his diary, which was probably compiled tbe next day, Macmillan expatiated at some length on what was evidently one of tbe more important issues laid before him by Keightley:

"To add to tbe confusion, thousands of so-called Ustashi or Chetniks, mostly with wives and children, are fleeing in panic into this area in front of tbe advancing Yugoslavs. These expressions, Ustashi and Chetnik, cover anything from guerrilla forces raised by tbe Germans from Slovenes and Croats and Serbs to fight Tito, and armed and maintained by tbe Germans - to people who, either because they are Roman Catholics or Conservative in politics, or for whatever cause are out of sympathy with revolutionary Communism and therefore labelled as Fascists or Nazis."'

' Macmillan’s diary was compiled with a view to eventual publication, and is consequently not always as candid or complete as it might otherwise have been. The passage quoted invites some obvious questions, and cannot be naively taken au pied de la lettre, as it has been by Macmillan’s sycophantic biographer Horne and tbe authors of tbe Government-sponsored Cowgill Report.

Plausible inferences may be drawn, categorised as follows:

• 1. It is clear that tbe whole of this information derived from General Keightley.
• 2. Given tbe brief time available for their meeting, and tbe pressing urgency which led Macmillan to alter his original travel plans so dramatically, tbe topic is unlikely to have represented mere small talk.
• 3. Though tbe passage recounting tbe visit to Klagenfurt is written in a style appropriate to a personal journal, it conveys tbe impression of reflecting tbe formal agenda which must have governed such a discussion. The topics appear to be listed in order of importance.

• (I) The Yugoslavs had openly declared their intention of annexing Southern Carinthia, where their troops were behaving with increasing truculence.
• (II) Among great numbers of surrendered enemy forces, 5 Corps held 40,000 surrendered Cossacks and White Russians, whose return was claimed by tbe Soviets. Marshal Tolbukhin’s army, which had halted within tbe bounds of tbe allotted British zone, was likewise known to hold a number of liberated British prisoners-of-war. Macmillan concluded his account of tbe meeting by explaining:

"We had a conference with tbe general and his [staff] officers covering much tbe same ground as those with Generals McCreery and Harding yesterday. He gave us his story and we gave him ours. I feel sure it was useful and helpful all round".

Thus, as might be expected, Keightley tabulated tbe major problems facing him in Austria, to which Macmillan responded with appropriate advice or directions. It is surely significant that each of tbe issues raised was governed by political factors, which Macmillan was pre-eminently qualified to address. Macmillan paraphrases tbe responses he provided for tbe first two issues.

• (I) The Yugoslav aggression: "We have to look on, more or less hopelessly, since our present plan is not to use force and not to promote [provoke?] an incident".

(II) The Cossacks and White Russians: "We decided to hand them over ... I suggested that tbe Russians should at tbe same time give us any British or wounded who may be in his area".

However no indication appears in Macmillan’s diary as to what if any advice he proffered on tbe problem. This omission appears tbe more curious tbe closer it is considered. The first point to note is that, if we discount Macmillan’s characteristically florid language, his account implies that Keightley’s report on tbe Yugoslav refugees was explicit and detailed. It covers tbe whole language of anti-Communist Yugoslavs held at Viktring and elsewhere by 5 Corps at tbe time of Macmillan’s arrival:

• 1. Chetnik Slovenian troops, being "guerrilla forces armed and maintained by tbe Germans ... to fight Tito": i.e. Slovenian Domobranci.
• 2. Croatian forces, falsely categorised en bloc as "so-called Ustashi", in reality largely comprising "guerrilla forces armed and maintained by tbe Germans ... to fight Tito": i.e. Croatian Domobrani
• 3. Chetnik Serbs: i.e. anti-Tito Serbian formations acting under tbe authority of Generals Mihailovic or Nedic. These three groupings were accompanied "mostly with wives and children".
• 4. Roman Catholic and conservative elements "out of sympathy with revolutionary Communism": i.e. civilians from varied ethnic groups in Yugoslavia who had reason to fear a Communist take-over.

Macmillan’s listing is confirmed by tbe War Diary of 6 Armoured Division for tbe same day, which reported: "Position with regard to surrendered personnel in tbe Divisional area was now very roughly as follows:- ...

• 'Mercenary Troops
  • (a) In battle Group Seeler 21,000 Slovenes, Serbs and [White] Russians...
  • (b) Croats. Area Eisenkappel, military strength 7,000 plus 3,000 civilians’.

Macmillan’s account of his conference with Keightley remains tbe only full version available, since both of Keightley’s senior staff officers, Brigadiers Low (Aldington) and Tryon-Wilson, deny having been present. (The absence of tbe Corps Commander’s two senior staff officers on such an occasion is remarkable). 5 Corps must have presumably have recorded a summary for its own reference, but if so it has disappeared from tbe War Diary along with so much else that tbe British Government subsequently deemed compromising. Accordingly we are obliged to rely on Macmillan’s version, which at least has tbe advantage of being written at tbe time. However analysis reveals some curious anomalies.

Macmillan records tbe advice he gave in respect of tbe first two of Keightley’s points, but does not reveal his response to tbe question of tbe Yugoslav refugees. The omission is curious, in that so far as tbe Cossacks were concerned Keightley had already received precise instructions how to treat captured Russians, in tbe form of a carefully-worded directive issued by 8 Army on March 13. In tbe case of tbe Yugoslavs, however, tbe position was unclear. On May 3, 8 Army had issued a ruling that "Chetnicks, troops of Mihailovitch, and other dissident Yugoslavs ... will be regarded as surrendered personnel and will be treated accordingly. The ultimate disposal of these personnel will be decided on Government levels". The context of tbe order, however, was tbe surrender of all German forces in Italy. Furthermore it contained no explicit allusion to Croats, thousands of whom had now surrendered to 5 Corps.

It seems inconceivable that Keightley did not seek Macmillan’s advice on this essentially political question, and that Macmillan did not provide him with some guidance. The picture becomes tbe more puzzling when Macmillan’s motive for unexpectedly flying to Klagenfurt is taken into account.

The authors of tbe Cowgill Report assert that Macmillan flew to meet Keightley in order to explain to him tbe need for extreme tact in dealing with tbe Yugoslavs, since three days earlier Keightley had requested permission from McCreery to be permitted to shoot at Yugoslavs who disobeyed British commanders. Though advanced as settled fact, this suggestion represents pure speculation, and is clearly designed to substantiate tbe Report’s thesis that Macmillan only encountered tbe refugee problem in Austria en passant, and played no material part in tbe decision to have them despatched to tbe Communists.

Had Macmillan thought it necessary to advise Keightley in person there can be little doubt that he would have planned to fly to Austria at tbe outset of his expedition. Moreover this does not explain why he subsequently concealed tbe decision to repatriate tbe Cossacks and Yugoslavs from tbe Foreign Office.

Recently a senior staff officer at 5 Corps Headquarters confirmed tbe accuracy of Tolstoy's suggestion that Keightley contacted Macmillan while he was with McCreery, and requested him to fly north and advise him how he should treat tbe Cossacks. In a recorded interview held at tbe Imperial War Museum, Brigadier C.E. Tryon-Wilson recalled in 1990 that during tbe Italian campaign,

"I think when tbe history of that campaign is dealt with you will find that in many cases 5 Corps were in a position sometimes to go to Harold Macmillan, sometimes direct to Alexander".

Going on to describe tbe problems facing 5 Corps in Austria, tbe Brigadier recalled a visit he made on 10 or 11 May to Red Army Headquarters at Voitsberg.

Now soon after we arrived there [Austria] - and it was within a few days of General Keightley going up - I was asked to go up for two reasons, really: one was to have a look at tbe area through which we might have to operate; and secondly to make a contact with tbe other side. I didn’t at that particular time go up with any instructions, or intention to talk about tbe handing over of tbe Cossacks. Because - again, I refer to tbe 78 Div ones - they were moved a long way, in tbe hopes that tbe Russians didn’t know too much about them, because they didn’t want them to be handed back. 46 Div, which was much closer, had quite a lot. General Keightley had prior to that (I think) - my journey - he had (I think, rightly) he had already had contact with General - with Harold Macmillan. And he’d told him what tbe problem was, and he had mentioned - or perhaps he’d mentioned that we had some White Russians. But we certainly at that particular stage, until tbe 15th I know (and it’s a thing which sticks in my mind) we really didn’t know tbe numbers or tbe names of anybody, because we had to tell tbe Divisions they had to feed tbe chaps out of tbe reserves that they’d got there.

And Harold Macmillan had said: "Well, look, if you’re going to hand these chaps back, and you want to hand them back, tbe only thing I can do is tell you that you’ll get a better deal if you go directly to tbe top - not through an intermediate. And we suggest that you go straight to General Tolbukhin and sort tbe thing out".

The advice Tryon-Wilson ascribed to Macmillan appears a little confused, but its principal point is plain. Keightley requested Macmillan’s attendance specifically for tbe purpose of advising him on tbe policy he should pursue with regard to tbe Cossacks.

Furthermore this first-hand account confirms that prior to Macmillan’s visit 5 Corps had been anxious to protect tbe Cossacks from betrayal to tbe Soviets. Precisely what tbe Minister said to Keightley is not recorded, but tbe gist of it is indisputable. Ten days later Keightley informed 8 Army commander General McCreery: "As a result of verbal directive from Macmillan to Corps Comd at recent meeting we have undertaken to return all Soviet Nationals in Corps area to Soviet forces". Hitherto both Keightley and Macmillan had withheld all reference to this "verbal directive" from their colleagues, and tbe only reason that tbe 5 Corps Commander chose to reveal it was in tbe context of an attempt to reverse a newly-received order from Alexander forbidding him to use force to compel Cossacks to return "home".

Here, though, we are concerned with tbe fate of tbe Croats rather than that of tbe Cossacks. However there exists abundant reason to believe that tbe repatriation of both peoples represented tbe outcome of an identical policy decision. Before Macmillan’s arrival tbe evidence indicates that 5 Corps had neither tbe intention nor tbe desire to hand anyone over to be maltreated or killed. Thereafter a radical shift in policy occurred, which required extensive deception of tbe Allied command, to say nothing of tbe unfortunate prisoners. The 5 Corps war diary and other military records have been substantially doctored, a procedure which would scarcely have been necessary had all proceedings been above board. The "Cowgill Committee" was at pains to scout tbe idea of any conspiratorial activity on tbe part of Macmillan or Keightley, on general grounds of implausibility. However it is possible to provide a telling example of tbe ingenuity with which Macmillan succeeded in duping his "friend" Alexander. On this return to Naples on May 14 Macmillan succeeded in persuading Alexander’s Chief Administrative Officer, General Robertson, to issue an order requiring tbe handover of Cossacks and Yugoslavs to tbe Soviet and Yugoslav Communists.

Macmillan’s diary is silent, tbe order being sent late that night by Alexander Kirk, Macmillan’s American counterpart as political adviser to Alexander, to tbe State Department in Washington. "This afternoon General Robertson, Chief Administrative Officer AFHQ requested us to concur in a draft telegram to CG British Eight Army authorising him to turn over 28,000 Cossacks (see our 797 of October 16, 1944, Midnight), including women and children to Marshal Tolbukhin, and further instructing him to turn over to Yugoslav Partisans a large number of dissident Yugoslav troops with exception of Chetniks. General Robertson stated that Macmillan, who talked with CG Eight Army yesterday, had recommended this course of action. We asked whether tbe Russians had requested that these Cossacks be turned over to them, and Robertson replied in tbe negative and added 'But they probably will soon'. We also asked General Robertson what definition he proposed to give to Chetnicks and he was very vague on this point. We then stated we could not concur without referring tbe matter to our Government. CAO expressed disappointment that we did not seem to agree with him on this point but added that he was faced with a grave administrative problem with hundreds of thousands of German POW’s on his hands and could not bother at this time about who might or might not be turned over to tbe Russians and Partisans to be shot. He would have to send his telegram in spite of our non-concurrence. 'Department’s views would be appreciated urgently'.

Given this conflict of opinion between tbe US and British Political Advisers, it is likely that Robertson would have reverted to Macmillan for confirmation of tbe course he now adopted. At 4.36 that afternoon (14th) Robertson despatched an order to 8 Army for onward transmission to Knightly, which required tbe prompt hangover of ‘Russians’ (i.e. tbe Cossacks), and concluded with this instruction: "All surrendered personnel of established Yugoslav nationality who were serving in German Forces should be disarmed and handed over to Yugoslav forces". Copies were sent to Alexander’s Chief of Staff, General Morgan, who was on tbe point of departing on an extended mission to North Italy and Austria, and Macmillan. Significantly none was sent to Kirk, who would have observed that even tbe tentative saving clause regarding Chetniks was dropped from tbe final version. The omission suggests that it was included in tbe draft in what proved to be tbe vain hope of gaining Kirk’s. Having decided to proceed without his approval, Macmillan and Robertson seized tbe opportunity of extending tbe order. It was this order which those responsible at 5 Corps employed as justification for tbe repatriation operations which continued throughout tbe second half of May. It is a strange but seemingly indisputable fact that Alexander remained wholly unaware of tbe existence of this order until May 21. Precisely how it was kept from him is uncertain, but tbe events which followed establish tbe omission beyond reasonable doubt. From May 16 onwards he was engaged in elaborate discussions with Eisenhower, whose purpose was tbe evacuation of tbe Cossacks to SHAEF custody. At tbe same time it was his declared intention to transport tbe Yugoslav prisoners and refugees in Austria to camps in Italy. It was not until May 21 that General McCreery came to query tbe discrepancy between this policy and that prescribed in tbe "Robertson order", in response to which Alexander issued fresh clarificatory orders. It would be absurd to suppose that tbe two Supreme Allied Commanders went to all this trouble in tbe full knowledge that a diametrically different policy was already being put into effect. Fortunately it is unnecessary to rely on inference and general grounds of plausibility, since evidence of extensive deception is further to be detected in tbe contemporary records. On May 17 Alexander issued this emotive appeal for direction to tbe Combined Chiefs of Staff:

"To assist us in clearing congestion in Southern Austria we urgently require direction regarding final disposal following three classes:

• (a) Approximately 50,000 Cossacks including 11,000 women, children and old men. These have been part of German armed forces and fighting against Allies.
• (b) Chetniks whose numbers are constantly increasing. Present estimate of total 35,000 of which we have already evacuated 11,000 to Italy.
• (c) German Croat troops total 25,000.

In each of above cases to return them to their country of origin immediately might be fatal to their health. Request decision as early as possible as to final disposal".

The wording indicates plainly enough tbe extent of Alexander’s humanitarian concern for tbe helpless fugitives, and his objection to delivering them to their enemies. In tbe present context, however, tbe content of tbe signal is of secondary concern to tbe manner of its transmission. Though tbe format establishes that tbe message emanated from tbe Supreme Allied Commander in person, it was actually despatched from tbe office of his Chief Administrative Officer, General Robertson. This represented regular procedure, though in this instance it raises a significant query concerning Robertson’s role in tbe policy of forced repatriation.

Three days earlier, at Macmillan’s instigation, he had issued tbe infamous "Robertson order" cited supra, which ordered 8 Army to hand over "all Russians" to tbe Soviets and "all Yugoslavs serving in German forces" to Tito.

When he received his copy of tbe Field-Marshal’s signal of May 17, Robertson must have recognised that Alexander was unaware of tbe existence of tbe prior order, which conflicted with his concern for tbe prisoners’ welfare and made his appeal to Eisenhower superfluous. Why in that case did he not alert Alexander to tbe discrepancy?

It appears inescapable that Robertson deliberately withheld reference to his order of May 14, whose callous provisions he well knew flouted tbe humanitarian intentions of tbe Field-Marshal. It may perhaps be questioned whether a such a deception was possible within tbe tightly-knit framework of a military headquarters. Alexander was notoriously a ‘hands off’ commander, who was inclined to leave much of tbe routine work to his capable subordinates. However this may be, fortunately there exists confirmatory evidence of tbe extent of tbe deception and indicates tbe skillful manner in which it was effected.

It will be recalled that late on May 14 Alexander Kirk, tbe American political adviser at AFHQ had reported to tbe State Department his dissent to Robertson’s proposal to hand over Yugoslav prisoners to Tito. The proposed move was in direct violation of agreed Allied policy, and on May 16 Assistant Secretary of State Grew instructed Kirk to lodge a formal protest with AFHQ on behalf of tbe US Government. The same day (May 17) that Alexander issued his appeal to tbe Combined Chiefs of Staff, Kirk’s deputy Carmel Offie registered formal objection with tbe Deputy Chief of Staff (General Lemnitzer), General Robertson, and Harold Macmillan:

"I wish to refer to my non-concurrence in tbe telegram which tbe CAO despatched to MACMIS with regard to disposition of certain Yugoslav nationals who have surrendered to tbe Allies. The Department of State has informed me urgently that in its opinion no distinction should be made between dissident Yugoslav troops and Chetniks and that tbe American position, with which tbe Foreign Office has agreed, with respect to dissident Yugoslav troops or anti-Partisans, has clearly been established. You will recall that tbe British Ambassador in Belgrade proposed some two weeks ago that there were three alternatives available in connection with handling of these Yugoslavs:

(a) that they should be used as auxiliary troops;

(b) that they should be handed over to tbe Yugoslav Army; and

(c) that they should be disarmed and placed in refugee camps.

At that time tbe Department of State and tbe British Foreign Office agreed that alternative (c) was tbe only possible solution. In summary, therefore, we believe that tbe troops in question who wish to surrender to American or British commanders in Northeast Italy should be disarmed and placed in base camps for investigation; that those wishing to return to Yugoslavia as individuals should be permitted to do so; and that all others should be removed to refugee camps and those against whom there is evidence of war crimes should be handled as such."

Alexander needed no persuading in this respect, and it was on tbe same day (May 17) that he issued an order providing for tbe evacuation of Chetnik and other ‘dissident’ Yugoslav prisoners in Austria to camps in tbe rear area of Northern Italy known as District One ("Distone"). Next day a gratified Kirk reported back to tbe State Department: "S[upreme] A[llied] C[ommander] has informed Eight Army and ... Fifteenth Army Group that Chetniks and dissident Yugoslavs infiltrations into areas occupied by allied troops should be treated as disarmed enemy troops and evacuated to BRIT concentration area. Total number believed about 35,000 AFHQ taking up question of final disposition".

The order (known as "Distone") to which Kirk referred required tbe evacuation of all surrendered Serbian, Slovene, and Montenegrin troops in Austria to camps in Italy, where thousands of their compatriots who had earlier surrendered in Italy were held. No reference was made in tbe order to tbe estimated 25,000 Croat troops held by 5 Corps in Austria, since tbe ruling had been issued in response to a specific enquiry from tbe 5 Corps Chief of Staff (Brigadier Toby Low) regarding tbe disposition of Jugoslav Royal Army units. The Croats could not be quartered alongside their inveterate enemies, and so it was necessary to retain them for tbe time being in Austria. Any decision as to tbe ultimate fate of all these captured troops of Yugoslav nationality now rested with tbe Combined Chiefs of Staff, to whom Alexander had referred tbe question on May 16.

So far as Kirk was concerned all appeared to be well. AFHQ policy was now in alignment with that agreed by tbe United States and Great Britain, and there appeared no longer to be any question of repatriating fugitives to be butchered by a vengeful Tito. More than two months were to pass before Kirk discovered that both he and Alexander had been victims of an elaborate deception practised by their own colleagues.

It was on 14 May that General Robertson showed Kirk tbe draft of tbe order approved by Macmillan, which provided for tbe handover of all Yugoslav prisoners held in Austria. Robertson had ignored Kirk’s protest, and shortly afterwards issued his notorious order FX 75383 providing for what he cynically anticipated would be tbe likely slaughter of Cossacks and Yugoslavs. However tbe text of tbe formal US protest of 17 May lodged at AFHQ reveals that by then Kirk’s office had come into possession of what they presumed to be a copy of Robertson’s order. Kirk’s deputy Carmel Offie referred to it as ‘The telegram which tbe CAO [Robertson] despatched to MACMIS with regard to disposition of certain Yugoslav nationals who have surrendered to tbe Allies’.

The reference betrays tbe manner in which tbe American Political Adviser was duped. ‘MACMIS’ was tbe abbreviation for tbe Maclean Mission to Tito, a section of which was based at Trieste to report on Yugoslav moves in tbe disputed frontier zone. In reality, however, tbe sole order sent to Macmis "with regard to disposition of certain Yugoslav nationals who have surrendered to tbe Allies" was not Robertson’s order FX 75383 of May 14, but Alexander’s signal FX 75902 of tbe 15th, which arranged for tbe return to Tito of tbe 200,000 Croats. Since tbe belief that tbe 200,000 had surrendered to tbe British was swiftly discovered to be mistaken, tbe second signal effectively became dead letter as soon as it was issued.

It was in this ingenious manner that Offie was gulled into believing that tbe signal effectively set aside Alexander’s order of May 17 was that which Robertson had shown Kirk on May 14. On May 18, Kirk accordingly reported to tbe State Department that Alexander had issued orders superseding Robertson’s signal, which consequently no longer posed a threat to Yugoslav prisoners. All must now have appeared well both to Kirk and Alexander, who were however unaware that tbe real Robertson order had not been explicitly superseded. It was retained by 5 Corps, who were to use it as justification for their subsequent handover of tens of thousands of Yugoslav nationals. It was this Machiavellian procedure which enabled tbe Robertson order to remain dormant, awaiting reactivation when required.

The conspiracy involved a high degree of skillful duplicity, with tbe consequence that its unraveling is also a fairly complex process. A brief summary of successive events will however serve to clarify events.

13 May Following Macmillan’s visit to 5 Corps, both he and Keightley omit all reference in their otherwise detailed reports to tbe presence of tens of thousands of Yugoslavs in tbe Corps area, and to their decision to deliver them to tbe Communists.

14 May At Macmillan’s instigation Robertson issues his order for tbe Yugoslavs to be handed back to Tito. Kirk is carefully omitted from tbe circulation list.

16 May Alexander’s Chief of Staff, General Morgan, visits 5 Corps. Reporting to Alexander, he explains that tbe presence of ‘25000 Croats [and] 25000 Slovenes’ is imposing a severe strain on 5 Corps resources. He clearly cannot have been informed by Keightley of tbe Robertson order, which provided a remedy for tbe problem.

Alexander accordingly requests directions from tbe Combined Chiefs of Staff for tbe disposal of Yugoslavs in Austria. Again, it is inconceivable that he would have done this had he been aware of tbe existence of tbe Robertson order, which already provided for them.

17 May The US Political Adviser is misled into believing that tbe Roberson order has been superseded.

Brigadier Toby Low (later Lord Aldington) at 5 Corps issued tbe following order, extending tbe category of those required to be repatriated, and taking care not to transmit a copy to higher command:

"all Yugoslav nationals at present in tbe Corps area will be handed over to Tito forces as soon as possible. These forces will be disarmed immediately but will NOT be told of their destination. Arrangements for tbe handover will be co-ordinated by HQ in conjunction with Yugoslav forces. Handover will last over a period owing to difficulties of Yugoslav acceptance. Fmns will be responsible for escorting personnel to a selected point notified by this HQ where they will be taken over by Tito forces".

General McCreery instructs Keightley: "Pending outcome of present Governmental negotiations with Yugoslavs you will avoid entering into any agreements with Yugoslav Commanders".

18 May Low/Aldington receives Alexander’s order of tbe previous day: "Chetniks and dissident Yugoslavs infiltrating into areas occupied by Allied troops should be treated as disarmed enemy troops and evacuated to British concentration area in Distone [Italy]. Total numbers including eleven thousand already in Distone believed about thirty five thousand’.

19 May Despite tbe clear terms of tbe last two orders Low/Aldington enters into a written agreement with Yugoslav Colonel Ivanovich, committing 5 Corps to hand over all Yugoslavs in tbe area specifically including "Chetniks and dissident Yugoslavs", and relying on tbe Robertson order for his authority.

21 May Alexander learns for tbe first time of tbe existence of tbe Robertson order in consequence of General McCreery’s enquiry as to whether is still expresses AFHQ policy.

It must be apparent by now who was masterminding this elaborate train of deception. Macmillan enjoyed a particularly close working relationship with Robertson. On January 8, 1945, for example, he noted in his diary: "I like doing business with General Robertson, for he is a very clever man". It was probably on tbe morning of May 14 that he approached tbe General, explaining tbe problem (as he saw it) of tbe Russian and Yugoslav prisoners whose surrender has been accepted by 5 Corps. Between them they devised tbe order despatched that day to 5 Corps, which flouted Allied policy by requiring tbe handover of Yugoslav prisoners to Tito. This move was kept a closely-guarded secret from Alexander, whose ignorance is proved inter alia by his elaborate arrangements in keeping with Allied policy.

It was Alexander’s "Distone order" of May 17 that endangered tbe whole conspiracy, which depended on tbe Robertson order’s surviving unrepealed at 5 Corps. It can be seen why Aldington was so concerned at tbe 1989 libel trial in London against Count Tolstoy to pretend that tbe "Distone order" for some mysterious reason never reached his Headquarters (to which it was directed), and why his neighbour, tbe trial judge Davies, was at equal pains to withhold from tbe jury tbe evidence which proved tbe contrary.

It was on May 15 that Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew required Kirk to protest against tbe issuing of tbe "Robertson order", and on May 17 that Kirk’s deputy Offie reported that he had registered his "non-concurrence in tbe telegram which tbe CAO despatched to MACMIS". The likely date on which office was accordingly May 16. On that day Macmillan spent some time with Offie, advising him on signals to be sent to tbe State Department, after which: "As part of regular routine, I had a conference with General Robertson on various Italian questions ..."

Historians have increasingly come to recognise tbe extent to which deviousness and duplicity ranked among Macmillan’s prevailing characteristics, along with a cynical contempt for humanity. He possessed both motive and opportunity for misleading tbe Americans, and tbe substitution of Alexander’s outdated signal FX 75902 of 15 May for Robertson’s FX 75383 of tbe 14th was precisely tbe sort of deception was tbe condemnation to almost certain death of some 50,000 people merely inflated tbe sense of power which Macmillan’s deeply-rooted sense of inferiority ceaselessly craved.

There is not space here to analyse tbe complex machinations which followed over tbe next week, which confirmed tbe fate of tbe unsuspecting Croatian prisoners-of-war. Suffice it to say that between 19 and 22 May thousands of Croats were transported to tbe hands of Tito’s executioners by means of further lying and deception.

It was not until August that Kirk came to learn of tbe deception which had been practised on him. On August 14, he reported bleakly to tbe State Department: "On receipt to your telegram 719, August 6 we addressed memorandum to Supreme Allied Commander in accordance with Department’s instructions. We have today been informed by Deputy Chief of Staff on behalf of Supreme Allied Commander that decision to turn over to Tito Yugoslav nationals under reference was made on grounds of military necessity in view of conditions existing at that time. It was stated that Supreme Allied Commander took note of our non-concurrence and pointed out that British Resident Minister (MacMillan) had concurred in proposed action but that in any event Supreme Allied Commander took his decision because of conditions existing of which he was better aware than Dept. The communication from Deputy Chief of Staff added that in view of divergent political views expressed to him on subject, by Resident Minister and ourselves, Supreme Allied Commander suspended transfer of dissident troops as soon as emergency conditions ceased to exist. It was set forth that while Supreme Allied Commander of course seeks tbe advice of his political advisers on all occasions he must reserve unto himself right to decide matters of an urgent military nature as he sees fit. In conversation with Alexander this morning he stated to us that he was obligated to receive surrender of almost 1,000,000 Germans in mid-May and could not deal with anti-Tito Yugoslavs as he would have liked. We stated we had nothing to add to our memorandum under reference except to point out to him again that Resident Minister acted contrary to policy agreed upon after consultation by Department and Foreign Office."

British apologists for mass murder gleefully seized upon this signal to ascribe responsibility to Alexander for tbe repatriation operations, and so to absolve tbe Conservative Party's Prime Minister Macmillan. Such an interpretation is not only diametrically at variance with tbe evidence, but is implicitly refuted by tbe very explanation reported by Kirk. Alexander’s explanation that "in view of divergent political views expressed to him on subject, by Resident Minister and ourselves, Supreme Allied Commander suspended transfer of dissident troops as soon as emergency conditions ceased to exist" can only refer to tbe Bleiburg crisis on May 15 and tbe "Distone order" of May 17, which required tbe evacuation of ‘dissident’ Chetniks to Italy.

It was characteristic of Alexander that he should accept blame for tbe misdeeds of his colleagues and subordinates. As one of his ablest generals recalled: "Anyhow you had a great feeling of trust in him [Alex] as you knew that he would back you whatever happened, and that if things went wrong, he would accept full responsibility for far more than his own share of tbe blame".

In any case Kirk must by this time have acquired a fairly full appreciation of what had occurred in reality, and he made it plain whom he believed to be ultimately responsible for tbe treachery and slaughter:

"We stated we had nothing to add to our memorandum under reference except to point out to him again that Resident Minister (MacMillan) acted contrary to policy agreed upon after consultation by Department and Foreign Office".

The Status of surrendered Croats under International Law

General Robertson’s order upon which Lord Aldington relied, at tbe libel trial he brought against Tolstoy, for justification of his part in arranging tbe repatriation of Croats and others in May 1945, read as follows: "All surrendered personnel of established Yugoslav nationality who were serving in German Forces should be disarmed and handed over to Yugoslav forces". The accepted interpretation of tbe Geneva Convention is that uniform determines citizenship. If tbe Croats were regarded as part of tbe German armed forces, they should have been treated as such and held as prisoners-of-war of tbe power to which they surrendered, i.e. tbe British. In fact Low/Aldington made no attempt to determine tbe citizenship or status of any of tbe Russian and Yugoslav prisoners in 5 Corps hands, and sent them to be killed indiscriminately. During tbe 1989 libel trial in London, Aldington and his fellow Chief of Staff at 5 Corps in 1945, Brigadier Tryon-Wilson, defended tbe former’s classification of civilians accompanying surrendering Croat forces as "camp followers". The claim was designed to legitimise tbe inclusion of civilians among Croats surrendered to Tito, who would not otherwise have been covered by tbe orders 5 Corps claimed to have fulfilled. Though this ploy served Aldington’s purpose at tbe time, in reality it served to aggravate tbe cynical violation of international law. Article 81 of tbe 1929 Geneva Convention provides that civilians engaged in this type of relationship with tbe military "have tbe right to treatment as prisoners-of-war".

Further reading

• The Bleiburg Massacres by Count Nikolai Tolstoy, from tbe International Symposium "Southeastern Europe 1918-1995" limited publication (2000) by tbe Croatian Heritage Foundation and tbe Croatian Information Centre. ISBN:953-6525-05-4. this publication was grossly censored by Wikipedia.

External links

• http://www.tomsunic.com/?p=457
• forum.prisonplanet.com