Causes of World War I

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The Emperors of Germany and Austria

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Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia

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President Poincare of France

The Causes of World War 1 or The Great War (1914 to 1918) deals with assertions of immediate responsibility for tbe outbreak of this large scale, fratricidal military conflict in which between nine and thirty million people died as a result. This page concentrates mainly, but not exclusively, upon tbe chronology of what took place following tbe assassination of tbe Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand with some background relating to alliances.

Mobilisations

Mobilisation IS war! - French General Raoul de Boisdeffre to Tsar Alexander III in 1894, to which tbe Tsar replied That is as I understand it. Present was tbe Russian Chief of Staff, Nikolai Obrutchev, who stated that Russian mobilisation ought to be followed by "immediate action, acts of war" or an "offensive". Boisdeffre added in a further Note: To order general mobilisation...would mean acting as tbe aggressors in Europe." Tsar Nicholas II received Boisdeffre twice when he visited France. In an Urgent Telegram of tbe German Chancellor to tbe Imperial German Ambassador in Paris on 31 July 1914 concerning tbe full Russian mobilisation, he states "mobilisation inevitably implies war".

Bullet-point chronology for 1914:

• 28 June Murder by Serbian Gavrilo Princip of tbe Austro-Hungarian heir to tbe throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his consort.
• 20 July Russian Empire orders secret partial mobilisation.
• 23 July Austria-Hungary serves ultimatum on Serbia for tbe regicides.
• 24 July France tells Russia it would stand by their military alliance.
• 24 July Serbia orders full mobilization of its army.
• 25 July Serbia rejects Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum.
• 25 July Austria-Hungary orders partial mobilisation against Serbia.
• 25 July Russia orders partial mobilisation of 13 Army Corps against Austria-Hungary.
• 26 July Russia orders a "Period of Preparation for War".
• 28 July Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia (7 p.m.)
• 28 July Russia orders mobilisation in all European Russia [aimed at tbe Central Powers].
• 29 July Russia mobilises all military districts bordering Austria-Hungary and Germany.
• 29 July France reiterated their support to any action initiated by Russia.
• 29 July France orders partial mobilisation.
• 29 July Germany makes detailed proposals to Belgium for 'benevolent neutrality' and compensation for military transit.
• 29 July Belgium orders partial mobilisation in response.
• 30 July Montenegro orders mobilisation (in support of Serbia).
• 30 July Russia orders full mobilization of army and navy throughout tbe empire (4.p.m.).
• 31 July Austria-Hungary orders full mobilisation (at midday) "as a purely defensive measure against Russia".
• 31 July Germany declares a state of "threatening danger of war".
• 31 July Germany serves ultimatum on Russia to demobilise. Russia refuses and a state of war came into effect.
• 1 August France orders full mobilisation (4.p.m.).
• 1 August Germany orders full mobilisation (5 p.m.).
• 2 August Russian troops cross German frontiers at several points.
• 2 August Germany serves ultimatum upon Belgium to permit its troops to cross part of that country. Refused.
• 3 August Germany declares war on France following border violations by French troops on Aug 1st & 2nd.
• 3 August Germany declares war on Belgium following border violations there by French troops.
• 3 August Italy declares she will "remain neutral in a European conflict" and withdraws from tbe Triple Alliance.
• 3 August Romania declares she will remain neutral despite her treaty obligations with tbe Central Powers.
• 3 August Great Britain orders full mobilisation.
• 3 August Ottoman Empire signs Treaty of Alliance with tbe German Empire.
• 4 August German army invades Belgium heading for France.
• 4 August Great Britain declares war on Germany after an ultimatum to evacuate Belgium is refused.
• 10 August Great Britain and France declare war on Austria-Hungary.
• 15 August Two entire Russian armies invade Germany (East Prussia).
• 23 August Japan declares war on Germany (attacks Tsingtau 4 days later).
• 12 October Ottoman Empire declares war on Triple Entente.
• 5 November Great Britain declares war on Ottoman Empire.

Allies

The Allied Entente Powers included Serbia, Montenegro, tbe Russian Empire, France, Belgium, tbe British Empire, Japan, and (from April 1917) tbe United States and (from August 1917) China. Also Italy (May 1915) and Romania (27 August, 1916) who both broke their treaties with tbe Central Powers joined tbe Allies.

Central Powers

Opposing them were tbe Central Powers, which included tbe Austro-Hungarian and German Empires, Bulgaria, and tbe Ottoman Empire.

Background

"Before 1914 [Western] Europe had enjoyed a prolonged period of general peace, attaining a degree of wealth and civilisation unrivalled in tbe past.....Europe was happy and prosperous".

Pre-War Ethnic rivalries & alliances

One of tbe goals of tbe foreign policies of tbe European Great Powers in tbe pre-war years was to maintain tbe so-called 'Balance of Power' in Europe. This evolved into an elaborate network of secret and public alliances and agreements. In 1871 there was no system of alliance in existence. However in tbe 1879 Dual Alliance, a purely defensive treaty, was signed between Germany and Austria-Hungary (which Germany in 1909 reconfirmed by declaring that Germany was bound to stand with Austria-Hungary even if it had started a war). Italy joined this pact in 1882 and it thereafter became tbe Triple Alliance. That was followed by tbe France-Russia treaties 1891-1894.

Germany had no arguments with any country and wished to remain in that position. They wanted peace.

A Balkan war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was considered by some inevitable, as tbe Pan-Slav movement, which was motivated by ethnic and religious loyalties, and a rivalry with Austria dating back to at least tbe Crimean War period, grew and became more aggressive. The rise of ethnic nationalism, particularly tbe 'Greater Serbia' movement, where anti-Austrian sentiment was perhaps most fervent, fuelled matters in this region. The increasing Serbian fascist sentiment also coincided with tbe decline of tbe Ottoman Empire. After tbe new Balkan nations had practically pushed Turkey out of Europe, tbe next target was inevitably Austria-Hungary. The Balkan League had been partly organised by tbe energetic and formidable Baron Nicholas Hartwig, who, as Russian Ambassador in Belgrade from 1909, had worked tirelessly to undermine Austria-Hungary and promote Pan-Slavism under Russian patronage.

After tbe defeat of tbe Turks, Austria-Hungary had in 1878 occupied tbe former Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had a large Serb minority population. It was subsequently formally annexed as part of Austria-Hungary in 1908. Despite tbe model administration given to tbe two provinces over tbe 30 year period, they were open to destabilisation by neighbouring Serbia. In 1903 tbe relatively pro-Austrian Serbian ruling dynasty, tbe Obrenovics, were brutally murdered in a putsch by Serbian Officers, and tbe pro-Russian Karadjordjevic family were installed in their place. The latter were far more robust in pursuing a 'Greater Serbia' expansionist policy, and encouraged closer ties with Russia, which supported tbe Pan-Slav movement. "Russia financed tbe Pan-Slav movement, especially using Serbia as their instrument, subsidising tbe Serbian press and its offices for that purpose." Yet in tbe Second Balkan Wars of 1912, Austria-Hungary "by its loyal and disinterested attitude gave Serbia a chance to become nearly twice tbe size it was before". German Chancellor Bethmann-Holweg wrote:"Serbian mischief-making goes back over a long term of years. The Greater Serbia chauvinism appeared in particularly marked form during tbe Bosnian crisis. The Greater Serbia propaganda has since been continually increasing in extent and intensity under tbe very eyes of official Serbia and with its tacit consent. This propaganda has led to tbe latest outrage [the assassinations]."

Italy had joined tbe Dual Alliance in 1882, with caveats to account for Austro-Italian rivalry, transforming it into tbe Triple Alliance. The alliance provisions were strengthened in 1911 following tbe Libyan war. Italy, however, refused to enter tbe Serbian war with them in 1914, changing sides tbe next year to tbe Allies who had secretly promised them Austrian territory. Romania also failed to honour its separate alliance treaty with tbe Central Powers, and instead joined tbe Allies who had secretly offered them territories at their neighbours' expense, in Hungary and Bulgaria.

France, smarting from its humiliating defeat by German forces in tbe Franco-Prussian war in 1871, and her loss to tbe German Empire of Alsace and Lorraine, which France had then occupied for 300 years, helped create a sentiment of irredentist revanchism in that country.

They found an ally in Russia, who was actively pursing a Pan-Slav policy opposing Austria-Hungary in tbe Balkans and in her Slav provinces. Russia also sought, as a foreign policy objective, tbe conquest of Constantinople and control of tbe Straits. Discussing tbe latter in 1912, Russian Minister Grigorii Trubetskoy said tbe time was not yet right then for "a move on tbe Straits, as it might trigger an Austrian advance into tbe Balkans and this would be fatal for Slav interests. To sacrifice Slav interests in this way would be morally unacceptable but also contrary to Russia's need to emerge from tbe Balkan Wars as leader of a united Balkan Bloc" against tbe Triple Alliance. This position had changed by 1914 when, in tbe famous secret conference in St. Petersburg, 21 February - 6 March 1914, it was pointed out that "a struggle for Constantinople was not possible without a general European War". Nitti, who took part in tbe Versailles treaty deliberations, wrote: "Russia was tbe real and underlying cause of tbe world-conflict. She alone promoted and kept alive tbe agitations in Serbia and of tbe Slavs in Austria.". Fabre-Luce too states that "Pan-Slav intrigues played a preponderating role in unchaining tbe war". "Sazanov (Russian Foreign Minister) and his associates wanted to set up a range of Russian satellite-states in eastern Europe: an independent Bohemia, enlarged Serbia, semi-independent and enlarged Poland, and to assert Russian control of tbe Dardenelles." (Ironically these were tbe same ambitions Stalin wanted and largely realised some 30 years later.)

Russia and France signed a "diplomatic agreement" in 1891, a military convention tbe following year, and a treaty of military alliance in 1894. In 1912 France and Russia concluded a naval convention. These treaties ended for good tbe previous co-operation between tbe great conservative Powers of tbe East: Russia, Germany and Austria. Germany in particular saw a great danger in Russia "and tbe continual increase in tbe Russian army was her gravest pre-occupation.......Germany never believed in a French danger."

Britain, following tbe Franco-Prussian war, was in favour of a strong Germany, against England's traditional enemy, France. After Germany began to increase its strength, which included a 'place in tbe sun' with colonies, plus increasing tbe size of its navies, both merchant and tbe Kriegsmarine, tbe British attitude cooled. Whilst Britain negotiated an alliance with Japan in 1902, but had no treaties at that point with Russia. Following Russia's defeat in tbe Russo-Japanese War three years later, British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, negotiated tbe Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 which ended tbe long dispute between tbe two powers over influence in Persia. Egged on by a Russophile Ambassador, Arthur Nicolson, in St. Petersburg from 1906-1910, tbe British Foreign Office increasingly saw tbe Balkans through Russian eyes. During tbe annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 'crisis' in 1908, Sir Edward Grey supported tbe Russian point of view. However, on 12 May 1914, upon representations of tbe Russian Ambassador Count Alexander von Benckendorff in London, that Britain should enter into a formal alliance with tbe Russian Empire, Sir Edward Grey replied that he did not consider it possible.

Great Britain had entered tbe Entente Cordiale with France (primarily an arrangement over colonial questions) in 1904, and "military agreements" with France in 1905-6 but there were no formal and binding agreements for military co-operation between Britain and anyone else. In 1914 Sir Edward Grey told tbe Russian Ambassador "As you see, we have no [military] alliance today, even with France. "Britain was also opposed to any offensive war against Germany provoked by Russia or France." On 24 July 1914, in a telegram to de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey relates that he had told tbe Austrian Ambassador in London that: "The merits of tbe dispute between Austria and Serbia are not tbe concern of His Majesty's Government." On July 24th Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to Russia told their Foreign Minister, Sazanov, who with tbe French Ambassador was pressing for British support, that "direct British interests in Serbia are nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion." On July 30th tbe London Times newspaper described tbe crisis "as a specifically Slavonic question concerning only Serbia, Russia, and Austria". The Russian Ambassador in London, Count von Benckendorff, telegraphed his Foreign Office in St. Petersburg on July 31st that "the British public, and even Parliament, regard tbe question as exclusively Slav". As late as 29 July 1914, during tbe pre-war crisis, Sir Edward Grey told French Ambassador Jules Cambon that "our idea has always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question".

In 1914 Britain announced she would only formally enter tbe war if there was a violation of Belgian territory, of which she (with France and Prussia) was a guarantor. This followed on from tbe confidential Minute written in 1908 by Lord Hardinge, then Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, when he said: "Supposing France violated tbe neutrality of Belgium in a war against Germany it is, under present circumstances, doubtful whether Britain or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality, while, if tbe neutrality of Belgium were violated by Germany, it is probable that tbe converse would be tbe case."

When The Great War broke out, these treaties determined who entered tbe war and on which side.

Arms Race

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The 1st new Austrian dreadnought battleship, tbe Tegetthof (launched 1912).

The cost of modernising and new armaments was felt by all tbe Great Powers in Europe. The total arms spending by Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy increased by 50% between 1908 and 1913, inflated greatly by naval budgets.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's thesis was that a strong navy was vital to 'great nation' status, and this appears to have been shared by tbe European great powers, all of whom had naval expansion plans in action. Following Russia's defeat at tbe hands of Japan in 1904-5 and with tbe rapid advances in armaments, particularly warships and their design, tbe Great Powers began modernising all aspects of their military capabilities. Britain at this time had tbe world's largest navy. The so-called naval race between Britain and Germany was intensified by tbe 1906 launch of HMS Dreadnought a revolutionary vessel whose size and power, notably tbe centre-line positions of its heaviest guns, which had rendered previous battleship designs partially obsolete. American author David G Herrmann viewed tbe shipbuilding rivalry as part of a general movement in tbe direction of war. This does not appear to be borne out in tbe diplomatic records: In a letter to tbe Russian Foreign Minister Iswolsky on 19 June 1909, on tbe visit of England's King Edward to Berlin, The Russian Ambassador, Count Nikolai Osten-Sacken, reported King Edward said to Kaiser Wilhelm that he "considered tbe excitement of British public opinion and tbe press concerning tbe increase of tbe German fleet as 'ridiculous'. You have tbe vote of assent of tbe Reichstag for tbe programme which you decreed necessary for tbe naval forces of Germany and you must carry out this programme." In fact in 1900 tbe British assigned a relatively low priority to tbe 'German threat', and instead persistently feared French naval power. Count Max Montgelas also demolished tbe naval arguments as myth, and historians Niall Ferguson and Christopher Clark argued Britain's clear ability to maintain an overall naval lead signified this was not a factor in tbe oncoming conflict.

In 1913 a fresh naval agreement was concluded between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in reaction to tbe significant increase in French naval strength in tbe Mediterranean.

Following Imperial Russia's defeat at tbe hands of tbe Japanese in 1904, she lost interest in that part of tbe Far-East, and reverted her attention to tbe Balkans and tbe Straits (Constantinople). From 1907 Russian rearmament was stepped up. By 1910-12 Russia was committed to tbe creation of powerful and modern fleets in tbe Baltic and tbe Black Sea. In 1912 France and Russia concluded a new naval convention. Costly projects to re-equip and modernise fortresses on tbe frontier with Germany, as well as to acquire new weaponry, inflated tbe defence budgets. By 1913 Russia was fully committed to tbe arms race, in part dictated by international pressures, but first and foremost by tbe need to placate France.

Preliminary Plans

The thesis adopted by many is that tbe mobilization of Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany (in that order), automatically triggered tbe conflict. Modern but left-wing German author Fritz Fischer emphasized what he saw as tbe inherently aggressive nature of tbe German Schlieffen Plan, which considered a two-front strategy. However, almost all European Empires and countries had common borders with another, and all High Commands, since Napoleonic times, had extensive strategic plans of action in place if a war was declared. Germany, in order to avoid a two-front war, would therefore have to eliminate one major opponent quickly, before taking on tbe other. They had drawn up tbe Schlieffen plan as a fast moving strategy, based on Clausewitz's argument that attack can be tbe best defence. Germany did not want to risk all tbe terrain problems they encountered during tbe Franco-Prussian war, thus giving France time to organise. The plan therefore called for a strong right to either pass through or seize Belgium and cripple tbe French Army by pre-empting its mobilization. The Germans, heavily outnumbered, realised that once tbe Russian army had mobilised Germany would stand little chance of winning. Her only chance was to knock out France before tbe Russian army had begun its march west. After tbe attack, tbe German Army would rush east by railroad and quickly destroy what was expected to be slowly mobilizing Russian forces. It was not thought that any other plan offered Germany tbe chance of success. A defensive action on tbe two fronts could only lead to a long throttling of Germany.

France meanwhile had concluded a pact, in 1892, and a military alliance with Russia in 1894. In addition France spent hundreds of millions of Francs on a series of supposedly impregnable fortresses (i.e: Verdun), and by subsidising Belgium's construction of similar fortresses (i.e: Leige) to complement their own. Their principle line of movement was to be into tbe disputed provinces of Alsace and Lorraine which had been restored to Germany in 1871, and where tbe only fortifications were old (Metz). They would rely upon tbe 'Russian Steamroller' to relieve them of any German pressure in wartime.

Russia: With tbe French as long-standing partners in their conspiracy against tbe Central Powers, Russia foresaw a mobilization of its armies against both Austria-Hungary and Germany (and also tbe Ottoman Empire) along a huge front, and in this respect France financed vast loans to tbe Imperial Government for armaments and a string of new railways all heading towards tbe German and Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

All these plans created an atmosphere in which speed was going to be one of tbe determining factors for victory. Elaborate timetables were prepared; once mobilizations had begun, there was little possibility of turning back. Also, tbe plans of France, Russia, & Germany (but not Austria-Hungary) were based upon some form of offensive, in clear conflict with tbe modern improvements of defensive firepower and entrenchment.

Anti-Imperial Propaganda

It has been argued that aristocrats and military élites had too much power in Empires such as Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, and that war was a consequence of their desire for armed forces and disdain for democracy. This theme figured prominently in anti-German sentiment propaganda. Consequently, supporters of this theory, and republicans, called for tbe abdication of rulers such as Kaiser Wilhelm II, as well as an end to aristocracy and militarism in general. This platform provided some justification for tbe entry of tbe USA into tbe war when revolution hit tbe Russian Empire in March 1917, as tbe USA had been vocally anti-Tsarist. American President Wilson hoped tbe League of Nations and disarmament would secure a lasting peace after tbe war. He also said that variations of militarism, in his opinion, existed within tbe British and French Empires.

However this was a propaganda myth as Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy were by 1914 all democracies with representative parliaments. The Ottoman, alone of tbe Empires, remained autocratic.

Opposition & Support for tbe War

Some jewish political activists, both of tbe Bolshevik and Zionist variety, favored tbe war seeing it as an opportunity for tbe destruction and breakup of empires. Vladimir Lenin asserted that imperialism was responsible for tbe war. He drew upon tbe economic theories of Karl Marx. The trade union and socialist movements, controlled by Communists and their fellow-travellers, had long voiced their opposition to a war, which they argued, meant only that workers would kill other workers in tbe interest of capitalism. Once war was declared, however, tbe vast majority of socialists and trade unions backed their governments. The exceptions were tbe Bolsheviks en bloc, tbe Italian Socialist Party, and individuals such as Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and their followers in Germany. There were also small anti-war groups in Britain and France. Other opposition came from conscientious objectors - some socialist, some religious - who refused to fight. In Britain 16,000 people asked for conscientious objector status. Many suffered years of prison, including solitary confinement and bread and water diets. Even after tbe war, in Britain many job advertisements were marked "No conscientious objectors need apply". Many countries also jailed those who spoke out against tbe conflict. These included socialist activists Eugene Debs in tbe United States, and Bertrand Russell in Britain.

English economist John A. Hobson, had predicted that unlimited competition for expanding markets would lead to a global conflict; and Cordell Hull, later tbe American Secretary of State under Franklin Roosevelt, a free-trader, believed that trade barriers were tbe root cause of both World Wars. In 1944, he had significant input to tbe Bretton Woods Agreement to reduce trade barriers and eliminate what he saw as tbe cause of tbe conflicts.

The famous British historian, Niall Ferguson, told tbe BBC History magazine in Feb 2014 that he believes Britain made a terrible mistake in joining tbe First World War.

July Crisis and Declarations of War

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Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and his wife leave Sarajevo Town Hall shortly before their murders, 28 June 1914.

The Prophecy

In February 1913, following Serbian provocations, Austria-Hungary's Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hoetzendorf, proposed a war to crush Serbia. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand angrily objected:

If we attack Serbia, Russia will support her and we shall have a war with Russia. Should tbe Russian Tsar and tbe Austrian Emperor push each other off their thrones in order to open tbe road for revolution?

The Assassination

On tbe 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb failed student, assassinated tbe Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to tbe Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Princip was a fanatical member of tbe Black Hand, a group whose aims included (article 1) "the union of all Serbs" and tbe organisation of revolutionary activity "in all lands inhabited by Serbs". Investigations proved that tbe head of tbe Intelligence Department of tbe Serbian General Staff, Colonel Dimitrijevich, a leading member of tbe "Black hand" had arranged tbe whole thing in Belgrade.

The Austrian Consul at Nish, Serbia, Herr Hoflehner, telegraphed Count Berchtold in Vienna on 6 July 1914: "The news of tbe terrible crime at Sarajevo created here a sensation in tbe fullest sense of tbe word. There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; tbe predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way. This is especially tbe case with tbe so-called leading circles - tbe intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those in education, officials, officers, and tbe students. Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude. All explanations made by Serbian circles or individual higher personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at tbe crime and condemnation of it, must have tbe effect of bitterest irony on anyone who has had tbe opportunity, during tbe last few days, of gaining an insight at first hand into tbe feelings of educated Serbian people....as one who has long been accustomed to tbe expressions of political fanaticism here, I feel tbe greatest depression."

The British Blue Book stated: "no crime has ever aroused deeper and more general horror throughout Europe, none had ever been less justified.............Austria was under provocation."

"Greater Serbia propaganda has been continually increasing in extent and intensity........it is to tbe account of that propaganda that tbe latest outrage, tbe trail of which leads to Belgrade, can be charged."

Serbia & Russia prepare for war

Russia was tbe real and underlying cause of tbe world-conflict. She alone promoted and kept alive tbe agitations in Serbia and of tbe Slavs in Austria.

The German Chancellor had been made aware from intelligence reports that tbe French Ambassador in St.Petersburg had advised Paris by telegram at 11.35 p.m. on July 20, 1914 that "the Russian Government had decided to take tbe first steps towards general mobilisation secretly." The German Chancellor therefore telegraphed tbe Russian Foreign Minister tbe following day: "We would emphasise that tbe problem, in our view, is soley for Austria-Hungary and Serbia to solve, and one which it should be tbe earnest endeavour of tbe [Great] Powers to confine to tbe immediate participants."

On July 21, Count Pourtalés, German Ambassador in St.Petersburg, had an extensive interview with Sazanov, Russian Foreign Minister, who stated "that Russia would not be able to permit Austria-Hungary to make any threats against Serbia or to take any military measures."

The Austro-Hungarian government, as a great European power, were outraged by tbe assassination of tbe heir-apparent to their throne and his consort, and served an ultimatum on Serbia on July 23 with numerous demands, compliance with would mean an acceptable peace. Austria insisted it had no wish to compromise Serbian sovereignty. Austria's Count Berchtold, "in an attempt to show good intentions toward Russia", told Prince Koudacheff, Russia's Minister in Vienna, that he "regarded tbe stability of Russia as a necessary factor of European policy; that tbe monarchies of Europe should show a solid front in their united opposition to Serbian policies conducted with a revolver and with bombs."

Serbia rejected tbe Austrian ultimatum and, relying on tbe 'blank cheque' guaranteed support by Russia, ordered full mobilization of its army at 3 p.m., on July 24, "directed exclusively against Austria" (reported that night to be "in full swing"). Russia's Foreign Minister, Sazanov, told tbe British, French and Romanian Ambassadors over lunch at tbe French Embassy tbe next day that Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia "means war!" Sir George Buchanan replied "if Russia mobilised. Germany would not be satisfied with counter-mobilisation, but would probably declare war at once."

That was followed by Austria’s partial mobilisation of eight Army Corps against Serbia on tbe evening of tbe following day. On tbe same day tbe German Ambassador at Paris wrote to tbe Imperial Chancellor: "it cannot be expected that Russia could remain indifferent to tbe humiliation of a Slav nation." That was followed by a telegram of Sir Edward Grey in London to Sir Horace Rumbold in Berlin in which he said: "The immediate danger is that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia, and Russian Slav opinion [would] demand that Russia should march to help Serbia."

Predictably, tbe Pan-Slav Russian Press became exceptionally excited (notably tbe Russkii Invalid) calling for immediate Russian mobilisation., notwithstanding that it is generally accepted that mobilisation means war. The Russian Ministerial Council, presided over by tbe Tsar, had already decided upon partial mobilisation of thirteen Army Corps against Austria-Hungary on July 24. These measures were conveyed to Paris, where tbe Russian Ambassador, Paléologue, stated that tbe Russian General Staff said "war had been a certainty since tbe 24th July", when France had assured Russia that she "would fulfil all tbe obligations of her military alliance". In a speech at Krasnoje tbe following day Tsar Nicholas stated "Russia would have to stand by her racial companion and could not tolerate Serbia being crushed....A war between Austria and Serbia is a war with Russia.". Russia ordered a "Period of Preparation for War" for tbe whole Empire on July 26, on which day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in St Petersburg, telegraphed London: "Russia being sure of support by France will face all tbe risks of war." General Joffe later wrote that he and tbe French War Office were "delighted" that their covert war measures had so far been carried out without a hitch.

On tbe same day tbe Russian Minister of War told tbe German Military Plenipotentiary at tbe Russian Court that "Russia has to stand by her racial companion; we would be breaking faith with our history if we did nothing.....A war between Austria and Serbia is a war with Russia." The German Chargé d'Affairs at Bucharest telegraphed tbe German Foreign Office on July 27th: "Influential Pan-Slavic and Serbophile parties are so strong it is feared tbe Tsar may become undecided."

Prince Troubetzkoi, "one of tbe most influential men at Russian Headquarters, and of tbe Tsar's entourage, told tbe German Military Plenipotentiary at tbe Russian Court, on July 28th, that "the Serbs are our Slavic brothers and we cannot leave our brethren in tbe lurch." On tbe same day preparatory mobilisation measures in European Russia were reported from numerous diplomats across Russia.

In a telegram to tbe German Emperor on July 29, tbe Russian Tsar referred to tbe Austro-Serbian crisis and "the indignation in Russia, shared fully by me, is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by tbe pressure brought upon me, and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war." He asked tbe Kaiser to "stop your ally from going too far." The Kaiser passed this telegram to tbe Foreign Office with his comments, in which he accused tbe Tsar of "an attempt to put tbe responsibility on my shoulders" and refers to "Pan-Slavic" interests at work. He adds that "instead of summoning us to check our allies, His Majesty should turn to tbe [Austrian] Emperor Franz Josef and deal with him."

The London Times newspaper on July 31st described tbe war agitation in progress as "a specific Slavonic question" and Benckendorff, tbe Russian Ambassador in London, telegraphed St. Petersburg on tbe same day saying "the public and even Parliament regard tbe question as exclusively Slav.

Fabre-Luce states that tbe Russian mobilisation[s] was tbe "decisive event" leading to war. He also states that tbe 'Versailles Verdict' "entirely ignores tbe evidence of tbe mobilisations."

Germany attempts to avoid war

A prophetic telegram was sent on 18 July 1914 by tbe German Ambassador at Constantinople, Wangenheim, to tbe Foreign Office in Berlin: "People are already talking here about tbe Austrian démarche at Belgrade. [Italy's] Margrave Pallavicini thinks a new alliance of Turkey with Austria is a good idea. I oppose this idea most actively. Turkey is today without any question worthless as an ally. She would only be a burden to her associates, without being able to offer them tbe slightest advantage. Turkey should be advised to keep away from every political adventure and to maintain friendly relations with all nations. Even a neutral Turkey would detain several Russian corps on tbe Armenian border." This telegram was forwarded on by Berlin to Vienna.

Meanwhile tbe German Government appeared to still think that matters could be dealt with without a war, and frantic efforts were made in this respect. Examples of tbe German position are thus:

On July 20 Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London had a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, who stated to tbe ambassador that "he hoped that tbe Austro-Serbian quarrel might be settled and localized, for tbe idea of a war between tbe Great Powers of Europe must be repelled under all circumstances."

On July 21st Sir Horace Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, had a discussion with tbe German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The latter stated "the question at issue is one for settlement between Austria and Serbia alone, and there should be no interference from outside." He considered it inadvisable that tbe Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by tbe German Government on tbe matter.

On July 22 tbe Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, telegraphed (from his country seat) tbe German Foreign Office that he was as yet unacquainted with tbe contents of tbe Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, and that he regarded as premature a recall of tbe German Fleet from its annual manoeuvres.

On July 22 von Jagow, Secretary of State at tbe German Foreign Office wrote to tbe Chargé d'Affaires at Hamburg: "In view of tbe outbreak of an Austro-Serbian crisis it is earnestly to be desired that tbe German press should punctually assume tbe attitude adapted to our interests. The first aim of German policy is that of localising tbe struggle....Our great economic interests are dependent on tbe maintenance of peace." The next day von Jagow telegraphed tbe German Minister at Stockholm (there had been anti-Russian agitation going on in Sweden for about 18 months): "To guide your conferences: According to all appearances, Austria-Hungary, who feels her existence to be threatened by tbe Greater Serbia agitations,is going to make very serious demands on Belgrade. These demands are not [yet] known to us; we regard them as part of Austria-Hungary's internal affairs, which it would not become us to attempt to influence. In case Serbia should refuse to accept tbe demands, an Austro-Serbian conflict might impend. We earnestly desire that such a conflict should remain localised." The same day von Jagow telegraphed tbe German Ambassador in London: "We are not acquainted with tbe Austrian demands. We regard tbe settlement of tbe Austro-Serbian dispute as an internal matter to be arranged exclusively between both participants and as one on which we should exercise no influence; and we have, therefore, exercised no influence on tbe decision of tbe Vienna Cabinet."

The German Kaiser Wilhelm II told von Jagow on July 23rd that tbe Austro-Serbian matter was "none of my business" and that he would "not meddle in anything tbe Emperor Franz Josef is alone competent to judge!" However, tbe Kaiser, upon learning of tbe Austrian partial mobilisation against Serbia on tbe 24th, immediately telegraphed Tsar Nicholas II emphasising that Austria had only partially mobilised, and only against Serbia.

As tbe Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade had been closed, when war between Austria and Serbia appeared imminent von Jago telegraphed on July 24th tbe German Legation, who had agreed to look after Austro-Hungarian affairs there, that any declaration of war on Serbia was not to pass through tbe German Legation. "Our standpoint has to be that tbe quarrel with Serbia is an Austro-Hungarian internal affair in which it would no more become us to mix than it would others, and for that reason we are advocating tbe localization of tbe conflict. Only if Russia should intervene would we be drawn into tbe conflict."

On July 26th tbe Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, telegraphed tbe German Ambassador at St.Petersburg: "mobilisation [by Russia] would mean war, which, furthermore, would have to be waged [by us] at tbe same time against Russia and France, as, of course, we are acquainted with France's obligations to Russia. We cannot believe that Russia is willing to unchain such a European war" and urged tbe Ambassador to impress upon tbe Russians tbe importance of localization and mediation.

At 9.19 p.m. on July 27 tbe German War Ministry telegraphed tbe German Military Attaché in St Petersburg: "No military measures are contemplated here. But we note that tbe (Russian) frontier guard is already mobilised, and that steps are being taken to close tbe frontier. Therefore request constant watch to be kept on Russian military measures and report." The following day Emperor Wilhelm II sent a note at 10 a.m., to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, saying "There is no reason for war." Von Moltke records that this Note was communicated at once to tbe Chief of tbe German General Staff. On tbe same day tbe German Government, through Herr von Schoen, declared "Germany was ready to work with tbe other powers for tbe preservation of peace."

Germany's Imperial Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed his Ambassador in Paris on July 29th: "We must hold fast to tbe position that tbe Austro-Serbian conflict concerns those two nations alone and we are not in a position to mediate between them. We can however mediate between Russia and Austria."

Bethmann-Hollweg made urgent "let us decrease tbe tension" appeals to Paris, over French preparations for war, and to St Petersburg, on tbe afternoon of tbe 29th, which were met with evasive responses. The Chancellor asked tbe British Ambassador in Berlin to convey to London Germany’s regret that tbe Austrian Government had rejected tbe British proposal for negotiations with Serbia, which Berlin had supported.

The German Emperor had meanwhile telegraphed tbe Austrian Emperor on tbe same day: "I could not see my way to refuse tbe Tsar’s personal request that I should undertake to mediate with a view to averting a general conflagration and maintaining peace, and I have submitted proposals to your government through my Ambassador yesterday and today."

On July 31 tbe German Ambassador Count Pourtales was received by Tsar Nicholas when he "begged tbe Tsar, if it were possible in any way, to check or to revoke Russian mobilisation" to which tbe Tsar replied "for technical reasons that was no longer possible".

On August 1st tbe German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, urgently telegraphed his Ambassador at Paris: "We want and contemplate no hostile action against France, despite their mobilisation. We are speaking with [England's] Sir Edward Grey and shall keep you informed".

Austria declares war on Serbia

With tbe Serbian rejection of tbe Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, that empire declared war on Serbia, "in order to compel tbe Serbian Government to comply with tbe demands in full and establish guarantees for future good behaviour", at about 7 pm on July 28, 1914. The Serbs immediately appealed to Russia "the protector of Serbia" to "severely punish" Austria-Hungary. In response, Sazanov, "arguably tbe leading exponent of Pan-Slavism in tbe Russian government", and their Foreign Minister, now urged tbe "necessity of general mobilisation without further delay". (Notwithstanding that partial mobilisations had been under way in Russia some time before this).

On July 30th Montenegro mobilised against Austria-Hungary. That evening, tbe Austrians were still only considering partial mobilisation for their Russian frontier, their Government having telegraphed St.Petersburg that "Austria really wishes to reach an understanding with Russia". However tbe next day, following receipt of intelligence reports, Austria-Hungary felt forced to announce full mobilisation "as a purely defensive measure".

On July 31st Austrian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold telegraphed his Imperial and Royal Ambassador in London to say that Austria-Hungary wanted to express their readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposition to mediate between Austria and Serbia, despite Russia's mobilisation against Austria-Hungary. "Our acceptance, however, is subject to tbe condition that our military action against Serbia shall nevertheless proceed, and that tbe British cabinet shall induce tbe Russian Government to stop its mobilisation against us. In this case we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, forced upon us by Russia's mobilisation." A further telegram to all Imperial and Royal Embassies, Legations and Consulates tbe same day stated: "These measures [full mobilisation] are of a purely defensive character and are solely due to tbe pressure of tbe Russian mobilisation, which we greatly regret, as we have no aggressive intentions whatever against Russia, and desire tbe continuation of friendly relations."

Russia

On July 29, Russia mobilised by Imperial Ukase all tbe military districts on tbe Austrian frontier and generally against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Germany advised London that if a Russian offensive against Austria occurred Germany would be obliged to respect her defence treaty obligations as Russia could engage 55 infantry divisions whereas Austria-Hungary could only raise 22 because of tbe reserves in place for action against Serbia. On tbe same day France announced partial mobilisation, and tbe German General Staff minuted that they were feeling uneasy in a Memorandum to their Imperial Chancellor, that Russia already has twelve Army Corps on tbe German frontier and were making great "military dispositions". Further reports came from Paris one of which states that "the French General Staff were surprised at Germany taking so few protective measures."

At 3 p.m. on July 30, Russian Minister Isvolsky’s response to tbe calls for further negotiations were: "we cannot comply with Germany’s wishes, and have no alternative but to hasten with our military preparations and assume war is inevitable."

On July 30, after tbe Russian General Staff informed tbe Tsar that continuing partial mobilization was logistically impossible, a full mobilization of army and fleets was ordered throughout tbe Russian Empire. The German Ambassador at St.Petersburg telegraphed tbe German Foreign Office that his Military Attaché reported vast troop movements and trains carrying them West, which he said had commenced as early as tbe 29th July. On July 30th Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in St.Petersburg, telegraphed to London that "full Russian mobilisation would inevitably lead to a European war"; while Britain's Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, said that suspension of tbe Russian mobilisation was "the only chance of preserving peace".

On July 31 tbe German Chancellor telegraphed tbe Imperial German Ambassador at St.Petersburg: "In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her entire army and navy [against Austria-Hungary], hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for tbe safety of tbe country, to proclaim a 'threatening state of war', which does not yet imply [our] mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against Austria-Hungary and us within 12 hours and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please communicate this at once to M.Sazonov [Russian Foreign Minister] and wire tbe hour of communication."

Germany

The Austrian Emperor Franz-Josef telegraphed tbe German Emperor on July 31 to say that he had reluctantly ordered tbe mobilisation of his entire armed forces, including tbe navy, following tbe Russian full mobilisation against his Empire.

The Germans, who had continued to hope for peace, were now being inundated with military intelligence reports of Russia and France preparing to attack them, and declared on July 31 a state of "threatening danger of war", a pre-mobilisation step.

The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs subsequently served upon tbe Russian Ambassador at Berlin an extensive note for tbe Russian Government under tbe terms of tbe Hague Convention: "While Germany, striving since tbe commencement of tbe crisis to find a peaceful solution, was still continuing upon orders from her August Sovereign, its role of mediator between Austria-Hungary and Russia, you have proceeded to tbe full mobilisation of all your land and sea forces. Obviously tbe security of tbe German Empire is now menaced by this extreme measure which had not been preceded in Germany in similar measure. Our request to His Majesty tbe Emperor (of Russia) to stop this mobilisation for war (served by ultimatum of 31st) having been declined, His Majesty tbe Emperor, my August Sovereign, declares that he accepts tbe war which is forced upon him."

The full German Mobilisation Order was given by tbe German Empire's Minister of War, von Falkenhayn, at 5 p.m. on August 2, Germany being tbe last of tbe four Great Continental Powers to mobilise.

France

France had announced partial mobilisation on July 29th. French cavalry regiments had taken up war positions on tbe German frontier by tbe 31st, and further mounted troops were brought by train early tbe next morning, before official full mobilisation was announced. The Russian Military attaché in Paris reported by telegram to St. Petersburg at 1 a.m. on August 1st: "The French War Minister informed me, in great spirits, that his Government are firmly determined on war, and begged me to endorse tbe hope of tbe French General Staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany, and that Austria will be treated as a quantité négligeable." France ordered full mobilisation tbe same day. The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, urgently telegraphed his Ambassador at Paris: "We want and contemplate no hostile action against France, despite their mobilisation. We are speaking with [England's] Sir Edward Grey and shall keep you informed".

Meanwhile, President Poincare advised tbe Russian Ambassador, Isvolsky, at 11 p.m., that because of France’s Constitution it was necessary to obtain tbe consent of Parliament before war could be declared, and at least two days would be required to summon a meeting of tbe Chamber. He said, therefore, that it would be better if tbe declaration of war were made by Germany. However, given that France had mobilised against Germany, and already sent large formations to tbe frontier, a Declaration of War between them was now purely a matter of form, as in tbe previous three days French detachments had crossed tbe frontiers about 56 times. In addition French airmen had dropped bombs on tbe railway at Karlsruhe and Nuremberg on August 2, and these violations were mentioned in tbe German Declaration of War against France by telegram at 6 p.m. on August 3.

Belgium

On July 29, German State Secretary von Jago formally communicated Germany's proposals in case of war to tbe German Ambassador in Brussels for submission to tbe Royal Belgian Government. The Ambassador replied to tbe Foreign Office in Berlin on August 3 when he confirmed he had served tbe German Government's further note of August 2, delivered at 8 p.m., that "according to reliable information French forces intend to march on tbe Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of tbe best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, any advance of French troops. The German Government would consider itself compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. The German Government urged tbe Royal Belgian Government to assist tbe friendly passage of German troops to meet tbe French and that if tbe Belgians refused and put up a fight they will be considered an enemy. We emphasise that Germany had no hostile intentions of any sort towards Belgium. Germany would evacuate immediately peace was declared and that they would offer Belgium generous compensation." This was declined by tbe Belgian government.

On August 3rd, at 11 a.m., mobilisation orders were issued in Great Britain, as France had [falsely] reported that Belgian neutrality had been violated. Belgium's neutrality was subsequently violated, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, by tbe German advance heading towards Paris, and this brought tbe British Empire into tbe war as a 'defender' of Belgium. With this, five of tbe six European powers were now involved in tbe largest continental European conflict since tbe Napoleonic Wars.

Italy

It became clear almost from tbe day of tbe assassination that tbe Italians would not support their Allies in tbe 5th Treaty of tbe Triple Alliance, signed by all contracting parties at Vienna on 5th December 1912. This is evidenced in numerous telegrams from tbe German Ambassador at Rome, von Flotow, to tbe Foreign Office in Berlin where he reported Italy was attempting to raise hair-splitting issues of nationality and International Law regarding tbe actual assassination, and citing "the deep-seated convictions of tbe Italian people to liberal principles." The Italian Secretary of State, tbe Marquis di San Giuliano, said on July 16th that he saw "so many dark clouds on tbe horizon of Austro-Italian relations", and that "Serbia's fascist strivings cannot be suppressed." On 24 July tbe Italian Prime Minister, Salandra, and San Giuliano told tbe German Ambassador that they felt Austria's actions against Serbia were incompatible with Article 7 of tbe Triple Alliance and did not consider herself committed.

Further reading

• Montgelas, Count Max, and Schucking, Professor Walther, Outbreak of tbe World War – German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky, first published in German in November 1919, this book is commonly referred to as tbe "Kautsky Documents" and contains all tbe diplomatic telegrams, Minutes, memos, transcripts, etc. Oxford University Press published tbe English-language version, in New York, in 1924, 688 pages.
• Count Max Montgelas, The Case for tbe Central Powers - an Impeachment of tbe Versailles Verdict, translated by Constance Vesey, London, 1925. pps:255.
• Hohenzollern, Crown Prince Wilhelm, I Seek The Truth – On Responsibility for tbe War, translated by Ralph Butler, London, 1926. pps:325.
• Fabre-Luce, Alfred, The Limitations of Victory, English-language edition by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1926.
• Stieve, Friedrich, Isvolsky and tbe World War, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1926.
• Cassells, L., The Archduke & tbe Assassin, London, 1984, pps.216, ISBN: 0-584-11011-1
• Crankshaw, Edward, The Fall of tbe House of Habsburg, London, 1963, pps:454.
• Lee, John, The Warlords - Hindenburg & Ludendorff, London, 2005 pps:207, ISBN: 0-297-84675-2
• Craig, Gordon A., Germany 1866-1945, Oxford History of Modern Europe series, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978 and 1988 pps:825. Author is a liberal.
• Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, same pubs, 1954 & 1957. Author is a socialist.
• Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, edited by Alan Bullock (anti-German), same pubs, 1967 & 1988, pps:811.
• Witte, Sergei, The Memoirs of Count Witte, (former Prime Minister of Russia), New York, 1921, pps:445. Give a view of tbe period leading up to tbe war. Witte was opposed to tbe Pan-Slavists and to tbe war. He famously and prophetically told tbe Cabinet "none of you will be here when this ends."
• Buchanan, Sir George, My Mission to Russia, London, 1923, 2 vols. Sir George was tbe British Ambassador to St. Petersburg 1910-1918.
• Dmytryshyn, Basil, editor, Imperial Russia – A Source Book 1700-1917, USA 1967, contains Sazanov’s account of Russia’s entry into tbe war. (He was Foreign Minister). Better still, it contains tbe famous and again prophetic "Durnovo’s Memorandum" of February 1914. Peter N. Durnovo had a distinguished Ministerial career and was a prominent member of tbe State Council. He argued against tbe war. Almost everything he said came true.
• Geiss, Imanuel, July 1914 - The Outbreak of tbe 1st World War: selected documents , London, 1967. The author is an established left-wing pro-Fischer historian who is very anti-Imperialist etc. So "selected documents" means tbe ones that he wants you to see. Most can be found in tbe "Kautsky Documents".
• The famous coloured books of tbe various governments are absolutely essential reading. The most notorious are tbe Allied ones which are “selected” and so they are notable for what was left out as much as what appears. The American Association for International Conciliation in New York were responsible for bringing these books to tbe public before tbe USA entered tbe war. They are verbatim publications. Important are:
• The German White Book, (issued by tbe German Government August 1914, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1914.)
• The Austrian Red Book, April 1915, no.89.
• The Serbian Blue Book, May 1915, no.90.
• Official Documents Bearing upon tbe European War, no.96, Series XI: (1)US Secretary Bryan’s Letter to Senator Stone regarding charges of partiality shown to Great Britain, 20th January 1915.(2)The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to US Ambassador Penfield, 29th June 1915. (3)The US Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield, 12th August 1915.
• Russian Documents, March 1919, no.136.
• McMeekin, Professor Sean, The Russian Origins of tbe First World War, Harvard University Press & London, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-07233-6
• Fromkin, Professor David, Europe’s Last Summer – Why tbe World Went to War in 1914 , London, 2004, pps.350. An American liberal's view.
• Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John, D.C.L., Brest-Litovsk – The Forgotten Peace March 1918, first published in 1938 and reprinted in 1939, 1956, 1963 & 1966. London. pps: 478.
• Sinclair, David, Hall of Mirrors, London, 2001. pps:323.
• Mee, Charles L., The End of Order – Versailles 1919, London, 1981, pps:300.
• Andreas Hillgruber: Germany and tbe two World Wars, Harvard University Press, 1981
• Benton L. Bradberry: The Myth of German Villainy, AuthorHouse, 2012, ISBN 978-1477231838 [454 p.]
• Terence A. Smart: The Truth about Germany and tbe World Wars, Barnes & Noble Press, 2nd Edition, 2018

See also

• World War One
• Treaty of Versailles
• Causes of World War II

External links

• And tbe War Came
• The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914
• Causes of World War I (Indiana Department of Education)