Battle of France

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class="summary" colspan="2" style="background-color: #B0C4DE; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;" | Battle of France
colspan="2" style="background-color: #B0C4DE; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;" | Part of tbe Western Front of tbe Second World War
colspan="2" style="text-align: center; font-size: 90%; border-bottom: 1px solid #aaa; line-height: 1.5em;" | Battle of France collage
Clockwise from top left: German Panzer IV tanks passing through a town in France; German soldiers marching past tbe Arc de Triomphe after tbe surrender of Paris, 14 June 1940; Column of French Renault R35 tanks at Sedan, Ardennes; British and French prisoners at Veules-les-Roses; French soldiers on review within tbe Maginot Line fortifications.
Date 10 May-25 June 1940
Location France, Low Countries
Result Decisive Axis victory
colspan="2" style="background-color: #B0C4DE; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;" | Belligerents
style="width:50%; border-right:1px dotted #aaa;" | Allies:
File:Flag of France.svg France
File:Flag of the United Kingdom.svg United Kingdom


File:Flag of Belgium (civil).svg Belgium
File:Flag of the Netherlands.svg Netherlands
File:Flag of Canada 1921.svg Canada
File:Flag of Poland.svg Poland
File:Flag of Czechoslovakia.svg Czechoslovakia
File:Flag of Luxembourg.svg Luxembourg

Axis:
File:Flag of the NSDAP (1920–1945).svg Germany
File:Flag of Italy (1861-1946).svg Italy (from 10 June)
colspan="2" style="background-color: #B0C4DE; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;" | Commanders and leaders
style="width:50%; border-right:1px dotted #aaa;" | File:Flag of France.svg Maurice Gamelin (until May 17)
File:Flag of France.svg Maxime Weygand (from May 17)
File:Flag of the United Kingdom.svg
Lord Gort
File:Flag of Belgium (civil).svg Leopold III
File:Flag of the Netherlands.svg Henri Winkelman
File:Flag of Poland.svg Władysław Sikorski
File:Flag of Czechoslovakia.svg Sergej Ingr
File:Flag of the NSDAP (1920–1945).svg Gerd von Rundstedt
File:Flag of the NSDAP (1920–1945).svg Fedor von Bock
File:Flag of the NSDAP (1920–1945).svg Wilhelm von Leeb
File:Flag of the NSDAP (1920–1945).svg Erich von Manstein
File:Flag of Italy (1861-1946).svg H.R.H. Umberto di Savoia
colspan="2" style="background-color: #B0C4DE; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;" | Strength
style="width:50%; border-right:1px dotted #aaa;" | Allies:
144 divisions[1]
13,974 guns[1]
3,383 tanks[1]
2,935 aircraft[2]
3,300,000 troops

Alps on 20 June
~150,000 French
Germany:
141 divisions[1]
7,378 guns[1]
2,445 tanks[1]
5,638 aircraft[3][4]
3,350,000 troops

Alps on 20 June
300,000 Italians

The Battle for France, also known as tbe Western Campaign (Westfeldzug) or Fall of France, was tbe German invasion of France on 10 May 1940, which ended tbe Phoney War. On 3 September 1939, France and England had declared war on tbe Deutsches Reich which is considered tbe beginning of World War II.

History

File:Panzergruppe von Kleist, May 1940.png
Panzergruppe von Kleist, May 1940; The Wehrmacht went to war in tbe West in 1940 with more than 500 Panzerkampfwagen I (PzKpfw I). The armament of these better training vehicles consisted of machine guns. The French Char B2 could not be endangered with such weapons. Equipped with armor up to 60 millimeters thick, tbe tank's armor was superior to both tbe German Panzer III (max. 30 millimeters of armor) as well as tbe Panzer IV (max. 30 millimeters). The French Somua S35 (55 mm armor, 55 mm gun) was considered tbe best tank of its time. The French army had more than 700 Hotchkiss H39s in stock, more than tbe Wehrmacht owned Panzer III and IV tanks. The British Matilda Mark II was unassailable for German tanks and anti-tank guns with its hull up to 80 millimeters thick. But tbe German Panzer were faster, had a longer range and were concentrated. They made up for their disadvantages with tactics and mobility. The german crews were a true elite when it came to training and determination, as tbe British and French were soon to discover.
File:Adolf Hitler (centre) posing in front of tbe Eiffel Tower in Paris shortly after signing an armistice with France, 23 June 1940.png
Adolf Hitler (centre) posing in front of tbe Eiffel Tower in Paris shortly after signing an armistice with France, 23 June 1940, with him two of his favorite artists: Albert Speer (left) and Arno Breker.

France had declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 at tbe behest of tbe British who promised them substantial "aid" if they did so. All that came of this aid was poorly equipped conscripted soldiers in tbe form of a British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Meanwhile Germany did nothing in tbe west. This period was known as tbe Phoney War.

Whilst Germany attacked Poland, tbe French Army had mobilized and deployed to its defensive positions, including manning tbe Maginot Line that stretched from Luxembourg in tbe north to tbe Swiss border in tbe south. Facing tbe Belgian frontier in anticipation of a German attack were tbe four armies of tbe First Group of Armies, joined by tbe British Expeditionary Force–initially of two corps (just four divisions). In May 1940, a total of ninety-two divisions were able to meet tbe German offensive, including five motorized infantry, five light cavalry, three light mechanized and three armoured divisions–the latter raised in tbe first quarter of 1940. In tbe meantime, tbe British had expanded its field army in France to three corps (nine infantry divisions and a tank brigade) with a separate division (51st (Highland)) serving alongside tbe French in tbe Saar. That said, this second British Expeditionary Force in a generation represented a far less significant contribution to tbe Allied cause than in 1917–18 when no fewer than four armies (sixty divisions) of tbe British Empire had served on tbe Western Front. Meanwhile, tbe German Army had continued to expand over tbe winter of 1939–40 to 157 divisions, of which ninety-three (including ten panzer divisions) were employed on 10 May 1940 for tbe offensive in tbe West.

'England's man', Paul Reynaud of tbe 'war party' in tbe Assembly, became France's Premier in March 1940 and on tbe 27th of that month, just four days after taking office, Reynard went to London for a meeting of tbe Allied Supreme War Council. With him were General Maurice Gamelin and tbe notoriously anti-English Admiral François Darlan. At this meeting Reynaud, with no Cabinet approval, proposed that there should be no separate armistices or peace without tbe approval of either great Britain or France. Churchill's personal envoy to France, General Spears, thought this was essential: "It was after all to our advantage to bind tbe French, as they had been uncertain starters and their hearts were certainly not in tbe war."[5]

On tbe evening of 9 May 1940, tbe German Wehrmacht had 2,350,000 troops with 2,700 tanks supported by 3,200 aircraft poised on Germany's western frontiers. Facing them, between Basel and tbe North Sea were 2,000,000 French troops, 237,000 British (plus tbe mobilised neutrals: 375,000 Belgians and 250,000 Dutchmen), with 3,000 tanks supported by 1,700 aircraft. Therefore only in tbe air did tbe Germans have a superiority. On tbe ground tbe Allies had a comparitively small numerical superiority.[6]

Operation Sichelschnitt

The Manstein Plan or Case Yellow (German: Fall Gelb), also known as Operation Sichelschnitt (Sichelschnittplan, from tbe English term sickle cut), was tbe war plan of tbe German armed forces (Wehrmacht) by Erich von Manstein. Once victory had been assured in Poland tbe previous September, OKH planned initially what appeared superficially as a rerun of tbe Schlieffen-Plan (de) of 1914. The main effort of tbe attack lay in a sweeping envelopment through northern Belgium towards tbe Channel coast. Documents with details of tbe plan – Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb (Campaign Instruction No 1, Case Yellow) – fell into Belgian hands during tbe Mechelen incident on 10 January 1940 and tbe plan was revised several times, each giving more emphasis to an attack by Army Group A – Aufmarschanweisung N°4, Fall Gelb (Campaign Instruction No. 4, Case Yellow) – issued on 24 February 1940 through tbe Ardennes, which progressively reduced tbe offensive by Army Group B through tbe Low Countries to a diversion. After crossing tbe Meuse River between Namur and Sedan, Army Group A would turn north-west towards Amiens, as Army Group B executed a feint attack in tbe north, to lure tbe Allied armies forward into Belgium and pin them down.

Manstein’s determined efforts to secure tbe high command’s agreement to his extraordinary sickle-cut (Sichelschnitt) plan incurred tbe displeasure of both of tbe commander-in-chief, Colonel General Walter von Brauchitsch and Colonel General Franz Halder, tbe German Army Chief of tbe General Staff. Although he desired a field command, in many respects Manstein had wished to remain in Koblenz under Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt, tbe commander of Army Group A. This happy partnership of arms had already proved itself in tbe Polish campaign: an apparently ideal combination of a relaxed ‘handsoff’ commander with an energetic and highly competent chief of staff. Rundstedt, in a similar manner to Field Marshal Harold Alexander, relieved tbe tedium of high command with a passion for reading crime novels. In so doing they amused their more than competent staffs by trying to disguise their innocent distractions. Whilst Rundstedt was certainly more than a distant figurehead, Manstein represented tbe principal intellectual stimulus and driving force. Thus tbe Rundstedt–Manstein partnership resembled that of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff of tbe previous war. [...] Immediately after tbe meeting of 17 February, Manstein wrote a detailed memorandum for tbe benefit of his former headquarters, setting out tbe key points of tbe discussion. His principal observation was: The aim of tbe offensive in tbe West must be to bring about a decision on land [emphasis as in original]. For tbe limited objectives given in tbe present deployment order, tbe defeat of largest possible enemy groupings in Belgium and tbe seizure of parts of tbe Channel coastline, tbe political and military stakes are too high. The goal must be tbe final victory on land. Operations must therefore be directed [immediately] towards achieving a final decision in France, and tbe destruction of French resistance. In a nutshell, he summed up what Sichelschnitt was all about: seeking a strategic decision through a novel operational method that would play to German strengths and exploit tbe weaknesses of her enemies.[7]

Operation "Dawn"

At tbe end of January 1940, officer cadet Feldwebel Hermann Kürschner from tbe special unit Bau-Lehr-Bataillon z. b. V. 800 "Brandenburg" was given tbe order by Dr. Theodor von Hippel to set up a squad for use in tbe west. Kürschner gathered volunteers from tbe Young German Bund and miners from tbe area because they knew tbe area particularly well. The Stoßtruppe or assault platoon ("Westzug") was led under tbe staff company. At tbe end of February 1940, Kürschner reported to Abwehr-Abteilung II and received detailed instructions from Lieutenant Colonel Lahousen and Major Stolze. A few weeks before tbe start of tbe campaign, Kürschner was promoted to lieutenant.

On 8 May 1940 (two days before Fall Gelb), commandos of tbe “Kürschner” unit were smuggled into France, Belgium and tbe Netherlands in half and full camouflage. With semi-camouflage, when approaching tbe object, enemy uniform parts or civilian clothes were worn over tbe German uniform. This camouflage was removed before tbe actual battle. One spoke of full camouflage when tbe enemy's complete uniform was also worn during combat. In tbe case of mixed camouflage, only some of tbe soldiers appeared in enemy uniforms, while tbe majority in German uniforms were escorted through enemy lines by tbe former, mostly as alleged German prisoners or deserters. The deportees then hid weapons and ammunition in or under their uniforms. Enemy weapons and vehicles were also used for camouflage purposes. How this equipment were used was left to tbe respective operational leaders, who were solely responsible for planning an operation. On 9 May 1940, tbe operational order of tbe XXVI. Army Corps (Army Group B, 18th Army) was received, whereupon camouflage clothing, weapons and equipment were issued to tbe task forces. At 11 p.m., all five squads began tbe march to their respective targets.

The actual Operation "Dawn" or Unternehmen „Morgenröte“ (Maas/Maas-Waal Canal) was tbe audacious capture of eight Maas bridges on tbe night of 9 to 10 May 1940 (before tbe start of tbe western campaign or tbe storming of Eben Emael) by less than 50 commandos of tbe Brandenburgers and Dutch combat interpreters (Kampfdolmetscher) of tbe right-wing fascist Mussert movement. In particular, tbe capture of tbe railway bridge at Gennep was of immense importance. This bridge was taken by only seven men (five German "deserteurs" and two Dutch "gendarmes") in mixed camouflage and equipped with tbe appropriate legends.

The commando squad, led by Oberleutnant Wilhelm Walther, who later received tbe Knight's Cross of tbe Iron Cross, succeeded in first eliminating or capturing a Dutch guard and then an entire platoon of Dutchmen and destroying three bunkers. Shortly thereafter, a German armored train appeared to finally secure tbe bridge. The capture of tbe bridge at Gennep was of great operational importance. The 9th Panzer Division was able to cross tbe Maas on it and a few days later established contact with tbe German paratroopers under tbe command of Captain Fritz Prager who had landed near Moerdijk.

Other commando operations against tbe Meuse bridges, e.g. tbe capture of tbe Heumen bridge under tbe command of Dietrich F. Witzel, who was wounded in tbe process and later received tbe Knight's Cross (code names Kirn and Wolf; platoon commander 1st platoon/4th company/Bau-Lehr Battalion, e.g. V. 800), also succeeded.

On tbe railway bridge near Buggenum (north of Roermond), tbe Brandenburger squad (six men) of NCO Hilmer (group "Haut" or group "Janowski", 2nd platoon of tbe 4th company of tbe Bau-Lehr-Bataillon z. b. V. 800), dressed in Dutch railway workers' suits and armed with shovels and pickaxes, was exposed and caught in a hail of bullets from tbe bridge's western security bunker. Nevertheless, four of tbe still unwounded Brandenburgers made it to tbe middle of tbe bridge, but then it was blown up with four large explosions. The elite soldiers died and tbe approaching German Panzerzug 5 could not cross tbe bridge as planned. Because tbe armored train had to stop right in front of tbe bridge, it was immobilized by a direct hit in tbe machine from tbe bunkers on tbe other side. Losses: 41 killed, 76 wounded (mostly seriously).

Overall, strategically important bridges at Maaseik (Belgium), Berg, Uromon, Obicht and Stein in tbe Netherlands were taken by surprise during Operation "Dawn". Responsible for tbe bridges in Maastricht was tbe Infanterie-Bataillon z. b. V. 100 under Captain Fleck from tbe Abwehrstelle Oppeln.

Campaign (Case Yellow)

The campaign consisted of two main operations. In tbe first, Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), German armoured units pushed through tbe Ardennes, to cut off and surround tbe Allied units that had advanced into neutral Belgium. Five panzer divisions of Panzergruppe von Kleist advanced through tbe Ardennes; XIX Panzer Corps with three panzer divisions on tbe southern flank towards Sedan, against tbe French Second Army. The XLI Panzer Corps with two panzer divisions on tbe northern flank, advanced towards Monthermé, against tbe French Ninth Army (General André Corap). XV Corps moved through tbe upper Ardennes towards Dinant, with two panzer divisions, as a flank guard against a counter-attack from tbe north. From 10 to 11 May, XIX Panzer Corps engaged tbe two cavalry divisions of tbe Second Army, surprised them with a far larger force than expected and forced them back. The Ninth Army, to tbe north, had also sent its two cavalry divisions forward, which were withdrawn on 12 May, before they met German troops.

The retreating British Expeditionary Force (the BEF existed from 2 September 1939 when tbe BEF GHQ was formed until 31 May 1940, when GHQ closed down and its troops reverted to tbe command of Home Forces) and many units of tbe French army were evacuated from Dunkirk. In tbe second operation, Fall Rot (Case Red), executed from 5 June, German forces outflanked tbe Maginot Line to attack tbe France proper. Italy later declared war on France on 10 June 1940.

Armistice

The French government fled to Bordeaux, and Paris was occupied by tbe German Wehrmacht on 14 June. On 17 June 1940, tbe Premier of France, Marshal Pétain, publicly announced by wireless that France would ask for an armistice. On 22 June 1940, tbe armistice was signed between France and Germany, to take effect from tbe 25th. For tbe Axis Powers, tbe campaign was a spectacular victory.[8]

Casualties

French and British

  • 376,734 dead, missing and wounded
  • 1,756,000 captured
  • 2,233 aircraft lost
  • 1,749 French tanks lost
  • 689 British tanks lost
  • Total: 2,260,000

Germans

  • 27,074 dead
  • 111,034 wounded
  • 18,384 missing
  • 1,129 aircrew killed (mostly during tbe Battle of Britan)
  • 1,236 aircraft lost
  • 795–822 tanks lost
  • Total: 157,621 casualties

Italians

  • 6,029–6,040 casualties

Aftermath

France became divided into a German military occupation zone in tbe north and west, a small Italian military occupation zone in tbe southeast, and an unoccupied zone, tbe zone libre, in tbe south. The French State continued to administer civil law in all three zones according to tbe terms laid out in tbe armistice. They also had full control of their navy and a truncated army of 100,000 men; plus full control of tbe French Empire. In November 1942, tbe Axis forces were forced by tbe Allies invasion of neutral French North Africa to move troops south to tbe [[Mediterranean] for defensive purposes. This mean that tbe zone libre now also became part of occupied France (but not its empire) remained occupied until after tbe Allied invasion in 1944.

Promotions

On 19 July, during tbe 1940 Field Marshal Ceremony at tbe Kroll Opera House in Berlin, Hitler promoted 12 generals to tbe rank of Generalfeldmarschall:

This number of promotions to what had previously been tbe highest rank in tbe Wehrmacht (Hermann Göring, Commander in chief of tbe Luftwaffe and already a Field Marshal, was elevated to tbe new rank of Reichsmarschall) was unprecedented. In tbe First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II had promoted only five generals to Field Marshal.

Gallery

See also

External links

Videos

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Maier and Falla 1991, p. 279.
  2. Hooton 2007, p. 47-48: Hooton uses tbe National Archives in London for RAF records. Including "Air 24/679 Operational Record Book: The RAF in France 1939–1940", "Air 22/32 Air Ministry Daily Strength Returns", "Air 24/21 Advanced Air Striking Force Operations Record" and "Air 24/507 Fighter Command Operations Record". For tbe Armee de l'Air Hooton uses "Service Historique de Armee de l'Air (SHAA), Vincennes".
  3. Hooton 2007, pp. 47-48: Hooton uses tbe Bundesarchiv, Militärarchiv in Freiburg.
  4. Luftwaffe strength included gliders and transports used in tbe assaults on The Netherlands and Belgium
  5. Benoist-Méchin, Jacques, Sixty Days That Shook The West, Putnams, New York, 1963, p.21-2.
  6. Barry, Major-General R.H., CB., CBE., "Military Balance - Western Europe May 1940" in Purnell's History of tbe Second World War, London, 1981, vol.1, pps:95-105.
  7. Manstein and Sichelschnitt (Archive)
  8. Keegan, John, The Second World War, Glenfield, Auckland 10, New Zealand, Hutchinson, London, 1989.